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Zusammenfassung 
 
Diese Diplomarbeit befasst sich mit dem chinesischen Weltraumprogramm und seiner Rolle 
im Kontext der chinesischen Entwicklungspolitik. Die Bedeutung ist einerseits durch Chinas 
wirtschaftlichen Aufstieg gegeben und andererseits durch das erhöhte strategische und 
kommerzielle Interesse am Weltraum. 
Der erste Teil dieser Arbeit versucht kurz den Weg Chinas zu seiner aktuellen Lage zu 
skizzieren. Die wichtigsten Entwicklungsschritte in Wirtschaft, Militär und Umwelt werden 
aufgezeigt um ein besseres Verständnis der Realität zu ermöglichen. Nach einer kurzen 
Analyse der aktuellen Situation werden die chinesischen Entwicklungspläne untersucht. Das 
Hauptaugenmerk liegt auf dem elften chinesischen Fünf-Jahres Plan, dem elften chinesischen 
Entwicklungsplan für Weltraum sowie dem Langzeit Entwicklungsplan für Wissenschaft und 
Technik. Die Analyse dieser Daten führt zu einem konkreteren Verständnis der aktuellen 
Ziele Chinas und ermöglicht somit eine Einordnung des Weltraumprogramms in die aktuelle 
chinesische Entwicklung.  
Der zweite Teil untersucht sechs Kernbereiche des chinesischen Weltraumprogramms. Es 
handelt sich dabei um das bemannte Raumfahrtsprogramm, das Mondprogramm, den 
Telekommunikationssektor, die Erdbeobachtungssatelliten, die Trägerraketen und 
Weltraumbahnhöfe sowie das chinesische Satellitennavigationssystem Beidou. Die 
Feststellung der Kapazitäten in diesen Bereichen lässt einerseits einen Vergleich zu anderen 
Weltraumnationen zu, andererseits zeigt es aber wie, und vor allem wie stark Chinas 
Weltraumprogramm zu seiner Entwicklung beiträgt.  
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 “不管是黑猫白猫，捉到老鼠就是好猫“ 
 It doesn’t matter whether it is a white cat or a black  
 cat. As long as it can catch mice, it is a good cat. 
  
Deng Xiaoping 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Recently, the topic of space and space security in particular, has become more important again. 
Since the United States (US) has published their new space doctrine, China has initiated 
programs and demonstrated counter measures1 aimed at preventing the US from dominating 
space, which is how China has perceived the new space policy of the US. China perceives the 
US space doctrine as a threat to the Chinese nation and thus feels the need to build up their 
own space capabilities in order to defend what they understand is naturally theirs: a spot in 
space. 
Set against this background this thesis is trying to improve the current understanding of 
China’s space program. While the times before the first Chinese manned flight were 
characterized by a paucity of data available, this circumstance has improved considerably. 
Although much more information is already available since Col. Yang Liwei made his flight in 
2003, western observers still find it difficult to tackle the lack of transparency in China’s 
space-related affairs. While existing reports often argue for either a dangerous build-up of 
Chinese space assets or highlight the relationship between People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 
and Chinese space program, this thesis shall try to shed light on how the Chinese space 
program is embedded in the general development efforts that China is making. This context 
hopefully contributes to the reader’s insight on the capacity and motivation of diverse projects 
of the Chinese space program. It shall show how the Chinese space program is linked to 
political and economical goals.  
My task is thus to create a coherent picture of the Chinese space program and its relation to the 
broad Chinese development goals. Research suggests that domestic needs are taken into 
account as well as international pressure and Chinese aspirations in regard to its position in the 
world community. The scope of this endeavor requires discipline in limiting the information 
available to the author. Detailed information regarding certain topics shall either be found in 
the sources cited, or future publications.  
                                                 
1
 One of them was the Chinese anti-satellite test in January 2007. 
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2. On Development 
 
The topic at hand requires an introduction to development and what the term encompasses. 
This shall enable an understanding of the peculiar Chinese context of development as it is 
remarkably different compared to the development that took place somewhere else. It is in 
this context that this chapter shortly deals with the more abstract context. In this process I 
shall explore some roots of development. Their understanding shall help to put the specific 
Chinese development into context.  
Development is a term with many definitions (Escobar 1992, Simon 1997). One may choose 
to analyze the evolutionary part of development as Darwin did, or to understand the physical 
origin and the creation of the universe as it is constantly exercised by astrophysicists. 
However, for this work we shall define development according to Stiglitz as: "a 
transformation of society, a movement from traditional relations, traditional ways of thinking, 
traditional methods of production, to more modern ways" Stiglitz (1999a). In his 
understanding traditional societies often tended to accept things as the way they were e.g. how 
long a person can live or how social issues influence our quality of living while modern 
societies know and embrace the notion of change. These developed societies look at a status 
quo and understand that a change of circumstances, deploying new methods or using new 
tools can lead to improvements, which in turn increases the quality of living. Development 
thus means to improve the existing capacities in order to reach new goals and solve very 
complex problems that could not be solved so far.  
In order to have a better understanding of development, it might help to understand its process, 
why and how it unfolds. The reasons for development are manifold but two of them show up 
often: humanity’s desire for improving its current situation and competition (Smith 1776). It 
is understandable that those who live in dire situations want to improve their lot, or at least the 
lot of their children. Thus this intrinsic motivation helps humans to develop new, better or 
cheaper solutions to an existing problem. The sheer unwillingness to cope with the current 
situation or its hardship can lead to new ideas or the establishment of new organizations e.g. 
the United Nations (UN) as an organization arose in the aftermath of World War II to make 
this world a more peaceful place. Similar reasons probably were responsible for the invention 
of antibiotics or vaccines against the common flue.   
The other aspect that deserves attention as a driving force for development is competition. 
Children tend to compete for the time and attention of their parents (Goleman 2006). This 
type of behavior is not only shown by kids but it is a basic pattern throughout our lives, 
   
   
  3 
different people exhibit it to a different degree, reaching from hardly existent to being a main 
reason for many actions. This behavioral pattern also shows up between companies and 
countries. Especially the rise of Communism paved the way to ideological competition as 
shown by US and Soviet Union (Gerovitch 2001). Another example would be economical 
competition between two countries. Take a shoe factory as an example. If a company 
produces shoes with the same quality but a lower price than another company, then this 
company will most likely manage to gain a higher market share, given its retail and marketing 
channels are well developed. Moving on to a macro-economic scale, a similar behavior can be 
observed. Those countries offering a labor force at a reasonable price, or at least cheaper than 
others, and a minimum amount of political stability because the absence thereof leads to 
frequent worker protests or other interruptions of working processes, will eventually attract 
more and more factories. International companies thus relocate their factories because of a 
chance to decrease overall production costs. This means that not only companies are in 
competition with each other but countries as well. Coming back to our understanding of 
development as rising to a higher level, this means that a country will constantly try to attract 
more companies because this means more work. More work in turn leads to higher 
employment rates. More employment leads to more disposable income for the average citizen 
which leads to more consumption and more investment in education. While more 
consumption tends to have positive effects on a country’s economy, a higher investment in 
education means will lead to better educated people. These people will again attract 
companies that look for better educated people thus improving the general level of available 
jobs and at the same time also increasing the average wages in this country. This whole cycle 
leads to citizens that have more income to dispose and to a country with a strong economy. 
Along the process described above, a basic social system and medical system might evolve, 
depending on many circumstances though. 
Another form of competition is of military nature. Throughout time different groups of people 
waged war with each other on account of various reasons (Keegan 1994). Due to this, nations 
often try at least to have a minimum deterrence that keeps other nations from invading them. 
Depending on whether a country tries to pursue simply a way of deterring others from 
invasion or whether it tries to build up an army that is capable of invading other territories, it 
always needs to develop military technology. In case of the former, it needs to adapt its 
arsenal with the same speed potential invaders do because a failure to do so would eventually 
lead to a fight of muskets vs. modern artillery i.e. a quick defeat of the technologically 
inferior country. In case of the latter it needs to research and develop new weapon systems at 
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least at the speed of other competitors, or ideally quicker in order to stay on top. Thus the 
military can often be a trigger for technological development as it might want superior 
technology or at least the same technological level as other countries’ military possess 
(Keegan: 3-60).  
While economical and military motives are seen often, competition can have another reason 
that is important in the context of this thesis: ideology. The key is to show the opponent that 
your ideology is better than his. A very efficient way to do so is to achieve something that 
many people perceive as very difficult or simply to perform well economically. Often very 
difficult technological projects are undertaken because of ideological competition. The Cold 
War is a good example. The Soviet Union and the US both tried to develop more advanced 
weapon systems and be superior in terms of economical output. The famous race between the 
Soviet Union and the US into space, and to the Moon, is another example (Gerovitch 2001).  
It was in the context of this ideological competition that both the US and the Soviet Union 
engaged in extensive scientific and technological research programs (Gerovitch 2001: 254). 
Some of them had psychological effects on the other side like the launch of Sputnik, the 
world’s first satellite, and thus Russia’s temporary first place in the so called space race. 
Other programs like the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) 
strengthened the Soviet’s military, which in turn initiated more technological research 
programs in order to win the arms race.   
It is difficult to say which area benefited most from this competition in the US or in its early 
phase in the Union of Socialist Soviet Republic (USSR), what it did though, was to spur the 
scientific and technological development. In many cases of development it seems that 
technology is involved or was the main force that enabled this development e.g. the steam 
engine in the industrial revolution. These findings suggest that technology can be a supportive 
force for the development of a country.  
Considering the context of my research question which is to understand how one available 
technological program i.e. a space program is helping the Chinese government to achieve 
their development goals, I argue that development and technology are intertwined. 
Technology often is one of the tools helping a country to achieve some of its goals i.e. 
technology for clean energy helps a country to produce (part of) the energy it needs–without 
polluting the environment. An issue or a problem often leads to the formulation of a goal 
describing a more desirable state. Often, but not always, a suitable technology can reduce or 
solve these issues e.g. installing filter technology in a power plant that is firing coal to reduce 
CO2 emissions, or to develop anti-ship missiles in order to improve national defense capacity. 
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This means that technological development boosts self-reliance i.e. the capacity to solve its 
own problems. Assuming that to solve most of a nation’s problems leads to a well-running 
economy, this should produce sound economic output. While being able to solve problems on 
your own demonstrates strength, the economical output of a country is a performance 
indicator and thus a useful propaganda tool, both internally and externally.  
One essential concept that can not be neglected in a discussion on technology and 
development is innovation. “Innovation is the process by which new products are created”, 
writes Krugman (1979: 259). Thus it is important to create an environment that fosters 
innovation. If innovation leads to more products in general, then it is reasonable to assume 
that it also leads to more products that are relevant for a country’s national security or 
beneficial to a country’s economy. The forces of the market, in this case demand, will 
determine whether a product is needed or not. However, for an economy it is important that 
new products can emerge and new solutions for existing problems are found. That way there 
is no need to rely on expensive technology import schemes from other countries. Newly 
developed products thus strengthen the economy of a country. Apart from economic strength, 
military strength is needed too. An innovative environment will enable the emergence of 
products for both the civilian and military sector. The ability of a country to develop its own 
products needed for the military is essential as there exists a myriad of international 
agreements and restrictions that do hinder certain countries to procure dual-use technologies 
e.g. the international traffic in arms regulations (ITAR) agreement (Federation of American 
Scientists 1997). Thus an innovation-enabling environment serves both the economic well-
being of a country and its national security. 
Understanding that China has been a technology-importing country for a long time (see 
chapter 3), it is important to note the focus on self-reliance and innovation in the current 
development plans (Zhongguo Shiyiwu Guihua Gangyao 2006: 42). The development speed 
that China has shown so far, the increased focus of new technologies as well as on the ability 
to develop new technologies on their own suggest that China is trying to move beyond being a 
mere manufacturing working-horse of the world. The export of satellite technology to 
Venezuela and Pakistan might be seen as first evidence of this technological progress. 
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3. A peculiar form of development – Chinese development 
 
While chapter 2 outlined some basic thoughts on development, this chapter focuses on the 
Chinese development since the beginning of the Open-Door policy implementation in 1978. 
That time has been a turning point in Chinese history. It is very useful to understand how 
China developed until now. This information serves to get an overview on the path that led 
China to its current situation and on the needs of the present. In a limited way the overall 
economic development, the PLA’s development and the environmental degradation process 
shall be covered. This information shall help to understand current needs and their evolution 
process better.  
 
3.1 Economic development 
 
In 1978 the People’s Republic of China (PRC) started to implement its Open-Door policy. That 
reform had its roots in the wish to improve current living standards and to strengthen China. 
While many former Soviet Union countries chose a big-bang approach for their transition 
which meant to try and change a Communist-led command and control system very quickly to 
a market-oriented system, China chose a path of gradual reforms (Heilmann 2000: 56-73). 
According to Deng Xiaoping’s slogan, whatever worked would be implemented. Throughout 
the reform China tried to focus on the “four modernizations”, which were agriculture, industry, 
science and technology and national defense (Nishitateno 1983: 175). During the reform 
process new ideas were tried out in experiments first to see whether they work in China or not 
(Heilmann 2000: 74-79). There was no tendency to take over proven solutions from other 
countries. The consensus was to try out new things and find a version of it that worked in 
China. Once it had been proven to work, it would be taken from an experimental level to the 
next stage only to finally become a practice followed by the whole country. One essential 
success factor has been pointed out by Rawski: “China’s reform success is based on the 
gradual replacement of state control with market allocation” (Rawski 1999: 139). This 
tendency to use whatever worked, led to a strong overall economic growth in the following 
years. 
During its Maoist period there have been many attempts to increase China’s economic output. 
The Great Leap Forward has been one fatal attempt (Bachmann 1991: 2). In its isolation from 
Western countries, which had developed mature technologies, and due to its low level of basic 
and applied research, China hardly possessed mature technologies. However, China needed 
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these technologies in order to increase their industrial output, to build up their economy, and to 
strengthen their military. It had to enlarge its basket of available technologies in order to 
reduce costs from product imports, at the same time these technologies helped to increase its 
own production output. This increase enabled China to build an export-oriented sector in their 
economy (Conroy 1986: 20).  
Until China implemented the Open-Door policy, imports from Western countries were low; 
this changed after 1978. China started to import more from other countries (Zhao 1995: 591). 
The technological, scientific and economic gap with Western countries spurred China to boost 
its technology imports i.e. industrial equipment and process knowledge. These imports served 
to improve its already existing industrial base and set the basis for an increase in its industrial 
output. In combination with low wages this enabled China to build up a strong export-based 
sector of their economy. One important tool in facilitating these technological imports were 
technology import plans. Data shows how much changed after putting in place the first 
technology import plan in 1982. While equipment was bought for 158 projects in the time span 
from 1979-1981, equipment for 3000 projects was imported in the period from 1983-1985. 
Although there were no numbers available on the costs of these projects, a rising tendency of 
technology’s importance can be observed (Conroy 1986: 28). 
Throughout the Chinese transition, experiments have played an important role. Many essential 
new techniques and systems were first tried out on an experimental level. These experiments 
were taken forth in so called Special Economic Zones (SEZ). Although the party propaganda 
did have explanations ready on how all these new mechanisms and so-far unknown elements 
fit into the Communist ideology, pragmatism was widely supported by the leadership. It was 
the understanding that one would have to try out and whatever worked should be implemented.  
The Special Economic Zones were places with many experiments. Nishitateno lists four 
properties special to these zones: basic infrastructure offered, preferential treatment in regard to 
tax, export-orientation and SEZs rules are similar to a free market (1983: 177).   
China’s approach to development since the implementation of the Open-Door policy focused 
on economic development first (Nishitateno 1983: 175). In the first stages of this development 
it was necessary for China to import the technology and related processes in order to achieve 
this economic development. Later on, the Chinese government started to focus on the 
indigenous development of technologies in order to save import costs on one hand and in order 
to strengthen China in economic and technical matters on the other hand (Rawski 1999). China 
still maintained its strong export oriented economy which helped China to achieve a positive 
trade balance with Europe and North America (People’s Daily: 12th March 2007). That way 
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China had vast financial assets available to engage in other projects that were deemed 
necessary for achieving their goals. With the rise of China as an economic power also came 
both the desire and the need to re-establish its military power. The military being one 
instrument for influencing other nations and projecting China’s power but at the same time 
being an institution that can refrain other nations from taking military steps against one country 
(Bao 1997: 8). It is this development that China has experienced since it opened up and it is 
this development that both China and the world need to cope with. 
All of these developments led to a large and continuous growth. China’s economic advance has 
been significant in its years since opening up. Data suggests that China’s place among the 
world economies, measured by its GDP, has moved from the 19th place in 1980 to the seventh 
place in 2005 (Kalirajan, Singh 2008: 2). Statistics also show that China plays an essential role 
in international trade at the moment, but they also show how quickly China increases its trade 
balances (Kalirajan, Singh 2008: 3). The fact that China is one of the current main exporting 
economies in the world also means that China’s trade balance is positive, for China. This in 
turn leaves China with a large disposable sum of foreign currency, which again increases 
China’s importance for the international economic system. 
Economic development was the guiding concept for the Jiang Zemin administration. However, 
the 17th National Congress of the CCP saw the inauguration of a new key concept: the 
Scientific Development Concept (科学发展观). Fewsmith shows how the concept has been 
around and used in many ways before its official inauguration at the last National Congress 
(Fewsmith 2004: 1-10). This new concept replaces the focus of economic development with 
building a harmonious society. This term of harmonious society includes social harmony as 
well as living in harmony with nature, thus attempting to solve existing social and ecological 
issues.  
 
3.2 Military Development 
 
China’s Open-Door policy was an important step on the way to its return as an economic 
power. Although the process of change started gradually it did so with constant success in 
terms of economic progress i.e. GDP growth. This constant growth over the years has led to an 
exponential rise in energy demand. At first Chinese indigenous oil production facilities like 
Daqing (大庆) sufficed to supply the amount of crude oil required and refined petrochemical 
products. However, the successful reforms led to an economic growth that demanded more 
energy than China could produce. Due to China’s lack of oil except for a few key repositories 
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it had to start importing oil in big quantities in 1993 (Leverett & Bader 2005: 189). The 
quantities needed by China’s economy kept on growing and still continue to do so. China’s 
engagement in Africa and South America is partially related to these needs for natural 
resources (Tull 2006: 460). However, geography and politics determined that there was no oil-
drilling country connected on land that would sign a contract. This way China had to start 
importing oil via the only economically feasible way: the seas. As Shichor has pointed out, this 
means that there are some bottlenecks at the moment in China’s acquisition process which 
could easily be used as a kind of throttle on China’s growth motor. Iran’s international politics 
add to this problem (Shichor 2008). The problem that arises with sea-based transport is in 
general similar to other big countries, yet different. While other nations transport their oil 
towards the West, China needs to transport their oil via the Strait of Hormuz, which could turn 
into a problem for Chinese oil demand in case of a conflict between the US and Iran. Thus 
there is a need for the Chinese government to find a solution in order to minimize this problem 
or at least build-up assets that would help to counter it. Looking at the worst case scenario of a 
military conflict with another nation or other nations, this need might be satisfied by 
developing a military that is capable of protecting these assets. 
Although the focus in China was on economic development in the early periods of the Open-
Door policy implementation, then US Operation Desert Storm made the Chinese military 
aware of the current capacity that the US military has. The quick and decisive battle ensured 
that the Chinese military leadership understood the necessity to modernize its own forces   
(Pollack 2007: 641, Dreyer 2007: 655, Cheng 2003: 29). Previously the military focus had 
been on size and not so much on efficiency (Pollack 1992: 151-155). Then China started to 
understand the need for modernization, especially in areas essential to warfare. These 
developments indicate what has been expressed in chapter two, the military competition 
between two countries as one essential aspect of competition and as such also a contributor for 
development.   
The PLA’s growth suggests its substantial importance despite the focus of economic aspects in 
the PRC at the moment. Rising budgets strongly support this argument (Dreyer 2007: 653). 
The current update and modernization of the PLA is often attributed to the force of the US 
military which has been continuously demonstrated over the last years in Operation Desert 
Storm, in the Kosovo War, in Operation Iraqi Freedom, and at latest in its military campaign in 
Afghanistan. Chinese military theorists strongly argue that China needs better developed 
military forces, especially compared to recent US military development (Wang & Chen 2004). 
However, the involvement of the PLA in Tibetan unrests in 2008 suggests that the PLA still 
   
   
  10 
plays a vital role in maintaining internal stability. Seen in this context, the question arises 
whether China already has the military capacity it needs in order to play the international role 
its government wants it to play. When comparing China’s economic and military ties with the 
world, there is still a big discrepancy. 
 
3.3 Environmental degradation 
  
According to Maslov, humans first focus on their primary needs i.e. food, shelter and activities 
of reproduction. Thus whenever a so-called underdeveloped country is about to develop, then 
during the first years of economic development the environment tends to be neglected. At this 
stage the development of income opportunities i.e. jobs are more important than taking care of 
the environment. That is what China did. During the first stage of development, it focused on 
economic growth, new job opportunities, the development of more industry in order to increase 
economic output and then there slowly started to appear an environmental consciousness which 
showed that the current development was not sustainable on long-term as too much would be 
destroyed in order to offer a healthy environment to future generations. Since the 10th Five-
Year Plan improving environmental problems are a core component of the Five-Year Plans 
(Zhongguo Shiwu Guihua Gangyao 2001).  
The time when China’s oil consumption could not even be covered by its own production was 
in 1993. That was when China started to import oil (Leverett & Bader 2005: 189). The 
quantities needed by China’s economy kept on growing and still continue to do so (Tull 2006: 
460). These growing numbers of oil imports also suggest growing consumption rates. In 
combination a steady and big increase in new cars that means that China’s environmental 
pollution has been growing strongly since it started to push its economical development.  
In combination with China’s reliance on its strong coal consumption and its lack of hydro-
electric power plants, in comparison with other types of power plants, suggest that the general 
economic growth that China demonstrated has also brought with it a constant environmental 
degradation. On one hand side this environmental degradation was caused by increased 
industrial and economic activity which led to an increase in energy. On the other hand the lack 
of technology to handle these environmental issues, or to prevent them, has contributed 
substantially, too.  
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3.4 Challenges of China’s Development 
 
One of the few constant variables that China showed since it started to open up was growth. It 
did so in economic and military terms but at the same time the hunger for energy grew. The 
time span between 1978 and the end of the 10th Five-Year Plan, 2006, saw a big increase in 
energy consumption and also in energy imports. Chinese development since 1978 is thus 
characterized by growth. The Chinese growth phenomenon brought along environmental 
problems. The successful economic development was partially paid by neglecting and harming 
the environment. 
The other key characteristic that needs to be pointed out again is the observation that China is 
one of the few transition economies that maintained its own path and that did not use the big 
bang approach to reforms. Data shows that this was a good decision as China had an average 
growth of roughly 10% in the last years.  While this growth has been accomplished in China, 
only a small portion of its population got wealthy but many people where heaved out of 
poverty. The gap between rich and poor is still considerable though. This inequality has also 
created a China with two faces. Social stability most likely requires a change of this situation.  
The last key change that was brought forth by China’s development is its growing influence in 
terms of political power in the world community. This growing economical and political 
influence has led to a growing concern of other countries. The growth of the PLA has not gone 
unnoticed. Not only the US but also other neighbours in South East Asia are uncertain what to 
make of this development.  
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4. Development processes 
 
Chapter 3 showed what has happened in China throughout the last 30 years in terms of 
development. The current chapter looks at development processes applied and shows which 
documents help to interpret current development goals. 
To understand the development process of the country with the biggest population in the world 
is not an easy task. There are different methodologies to analyze China’s development. Many 
recent analyzes of China’s maritime growth strategy for the People’s Liberation Army Navy 
(PLAN) focused on looking at Defense White Papers that had been published (Pollack 2007, 
Dreyer 2007). Although this is valuable information it is not very helpful to look at various 
existing White Papers of different areas and put together a development direction based on 
certain trends that can be observed in all of them. This approach has not been chosen for the 
lack of a more suitable one that is easier to follow and easier to interpret. Another prevailing 
trend with military analysts is to deduce a development direction from leading theorists in 
military journals. The pitfalls of this process have been shown by Fravel (2003).   
One methodology would be to interpret the current needs China has according to data available, 
and then extrapolate what China is trying to do. This is possible; however, it would take a very 
long time simply to understand some of the needs that China has. This means that a country’s 
development strategy would only be based on solving its issues as opposed to looking into the 
future and envisioning a desired outcome. Only after the needs are understood could one think 
about understanding where China is trying to go and what it is trying to do. This would be a 
two step process that would define goals based on the perceived needs.  
The other path is to understand where China’s leadership is trying to steer China. One of the 
most important documents that are available in order to understand the direction China takes 
are the Five-Year Plans. These plans show what China is trying to achieve, they present where 
China is going. The advantage this approach offers is to work with primary documents and to 
have an analysis based on these documents. However, while those plans show what China is 
trying to achieve it might still be useful to understand some of the most urgent needs to 
construct a broad development concept for China. 
 
4.1 Five-Year Plan 
 
Five-Year Plans are one of the key planning instruments that China has. They are drafted every 
five years and starting with the 10th Five-Year Plan the process of drafting it has changed from 
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being entirely reserved to the top leadership of the country to a consultation process that even 
ordinary Chinese citizen can take part in. The current plan thus contains input from a wider 
variety of people than before. So in theory the plan shows the development objectives that are 
essential for the overall well-being of the Chinese society. 
The 11th Five-Year Plan (2006-2010) is a strategic plan that only contains macro-economic 
measures from the government while smaller issues shall be regulated by market mechanisms. 
“Based on that consensus (note: of all people who delivered input), it was felt that the Five-
Year Plan should be strategic with development guidance and policy orientations. The strategic 
plan should allow the market mechanism to play a key role in guiding resource allocations and 
providing incentives to economic entities” (Xu 2007: 2). This describes the nature of the plan. 
It shows the strategic direction but does not outline specific details. It is in this capacity that the 
plan shall increase our understanding of which development direction China is trying to take. 
The development plan is then split up into more specific plans for each area like environmental 
issues, space issues, information technology issues, etc. These plans are then followed up in 
related entities that have the task to put these objectives into reality. It is also important to 
understand that binding and non-binding goals have been introduced as a new concept in the 
11th Five-Year Plan. A report of the Bank of Tokyo explains:  
“Starting with the 11th Five-Year Plan, the government has also separated the numerical targets 
and binding targets. The initial targets are those that should be achieved by the market, and the 
government will work to create an environment in which this is possible. The binding targets 
are defined as goals and the government must achieve through the efficient allocation of public 
resources and the effective utilization of government powers.” (Hagiwara 2006: 2)   
 
4.2 Medium- and Long-Term Plan for Scientific and Technological Development 
 
Another plan that is of interest and importance in this context is the mid- and long-term plan 
for scientific and technological development (MLP). This plan is issued by the State Council 
and hence has importance for many areas. The MLP is for the time span between 2006 and 
2020. Thus the MLP can be seen as an overall plan for the areas of science and technology on 
long term. The plan was created in a consultative process too and contains the input of various 
experts and political members.  
As of May 2009 there are various medium and long-term plans that the Chinese government 
has published e.g. on energy conservation, on renewable energy, etc. However, space being 
inherently a scientific and technical endeavor this plan has the most relevance for the current 
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research task at hand. Furthermore, there is another point why the MLP is essential for China: 
innovation. Due to import restrictions that were imposed on China by the US with ITAR, 
China is hardly allowed to import any sensitive parts that could contribute to space 
development. That means that apart from technology transfer deals with Russia, which have 
already been exploited in an intense way, or opportunities to cooperate with Europe, which are 
getting less after China first joining Galileo2 and then creating its own system, innovation is 
essential for China. Furthermore, innovation is seen as the prime force for economic 
development in the 21st century. Increasing China’s innovation capacity shall help the country 
to emerge as a true leader in the 21st century (Chen & Chen 2009).  
In terms of measurements the MLP for Scientific and Technological Development calls for 
more than 2.5% of the GDP to be invested in research and development. Dependence on 
foreign technologies should be reduced to less than 30% and science and technology’s 
contribution to economic growth should be at least 60% (Erawatch 2006). 
The success of a plan will always depend on the general circumstances and those people 
involved in its implementation. Considering this, one can never be sure whether a plan will be 
implemented or not. In case of both the Five-Year Plan and the MLP one needs to consider the 
extent of these plans and involved entities. Take environment as an example: the plan to reduce 
carbon dioxide emissions has an impact on whole China, and essentially every entity that 
produces an essential amount of carbon dioxides or other gases contributing to global warming, 
has a big impact on achieving the goals or not. Thus that goal is difficult to fulfill. Space on the 
other hand is different. While there are potential quality issues that can arise, at least all entities 
that are involved in this business are government-owned. This means that the government has a 
high leverage on what happens within the space sector. All these employees are governmental 
employees and so pressure can be applied in various ways in comparison to other sectors that 
have already been privatized and are hard to reach with the government’s arm. Thus it is useful 
to look at these plans. 
 
4.3 Development needs 
 
A plan by nature never contains all the activities a country has to undertake for advancing. 
Some goals might be of a nature that a country would prefer to conceal and so they are not 
found in official plans. Others might occur during the implementation of a plan, or they might 
arise as a side effect of the implementation e.g. China’s environmental pollution has been 
                                                 
2
 A global satellite navigation system installed, controlled and maintained by the European Union, according to 
the concept. The project has only been started but has hardly shown any progress.  
   
   
  15 
created as a side effect of its economic growth. At the moment the eradication of 
environmental issues has been made a key area in the current Five-Year Plan (Zhongguo 
Shiyiwu Guihua Gangyao 2006: 68). In spotting and observing environmental issues space can 
be useful because satellites can observe a big area and deliver data for the whole country. This 
leads to the conclusion that apart from reading current development plans an observer of 
China’s development has to understand its current development needs and has to anticipate 
China’s future needs in order to see whether space activities fit or not. To anticipate future 
needs is necessary because space projects and other long-term projects i.e. energy supply or 
national defense exceed the relatively short period of five years. Space projects for example 
take longer than other projects to design and to implement due to their increased testing phase, 
which is necessary both due to the harsh space environment and because of the high costs a 
space project usually has. So if China wants to have a satellite navigation system ready by 
2020, it should have started the research and development phase between 2000 and 2005, 
assuming that they already had experience in building space systems of this scale.   
The findings in this chapter show that Five-Year Plans constitute a valuable resource in 
understanding the short term development of China. While they do not reveal details, they are a 
valuable indicator of the direction that China is embarking on. That in turn is necessary to 
understand how the current space program is relating to the Chinese development at the 
moment and in the near future. 
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5. Current Chinese development plans  
 
Following chapter 4 which has shown which role the Five-Year Plans and the medium- and 
long-term development plan for scientific and technological development play in China’s 
development, this section looks at these documents in detail and analyzes the broad 
development direction that China is currently taking. 
 
5.1 Development focus 
 
This section shows the current development direction China is embarking on. It outlines some 
key development goals for understanding the greater context that the space program is 
embedded in. These goals are taken from the current Five-Year Plan and thus represent the 
official development agenda. However, the first part of this section starts of with perceived 
needs of China in order to supplement the development goals with other observations with the 
idea of getting a better understanding of what is required and what China is attempting to 
achieve. 
Following the last years’ fast economic growth, China has to deal with at least two big 
problems: environmental issues and a widening gap between rich and poor (Stiglitz 2006, Fan 
2006). The burden of environmental issues increases every day due to a growing industry and 
presents a rising threat to China’s sustainable development. The gap between rich and poor on 
the other hand has been widening for a long time, but in order to reduce the potential for social 
unrest China has to limit it. Another important goal in the 11th Five-Year Plan is innovation. 
Depending on the point of view, one could argue that the gap between rich and poor strongly 
depends on education, as it enables the Chinese people to be innovative. This leads to more 
business opportunities which allow higher incomes. Based on this belief, the Chinese 
government has also stepped up its efforts to increase the educational gap and thus strengthen 
its innovation capacity (Stiglitz 2006).  
First a few words on why those issues underneath have been chosen. The broad development 
direction that China is engaging in is still to strengthen China’s economic and national strength. 
While the economy in the past might have been strengthened through an increased import of 
technology or more input for achieving a better output, the times have changed. Currently 
China focuses on innovation. In a world that regards knowledge as an essential commodity, 
China wants to shift from offering low cost and work intensive products to knowledge-based 
products. Being able to handle innovation processes also enables China to develop solutions 
fitting its own needs. Furthermore, with increasing the innovation capacity China also boosts 
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its self-reliance. This issue has been chosen because of the importance of technological 
progress and the creation of knowledge in the current world. 
Two other factors that contribute to economic growth and to stability are China’s energy 
supply and its national and international security. Understanding that China is still trying to 
become a stronger and better country, it is essential to know what China needs for realizing this 
goal. Energy is one of the key ingredients to China’s economy that is still very labor intensive. 
Additionally, China does not have large oil reserves on its own which means that it has to 
import these reserves or to develop alternative energy production techniques, which leads to 
innovation again. Relating China’s energy demand to international security is necessary 
because China’s supply routes have some choking points. In general China’s energy supply via 
the high seas needs protection in case of an international conflict. However, regarding recent 
publications from the US, many analysts seem concerned regarding China’s economic and 
military growth (Smith 2003, Pillsburry 2007). All these findings render international security 
an essential need for China in the time to come. 
Returning to China’s internal state of affairs there are two essential issues that need to be 
considered to allow China’s economic growth and thus an increase in national strength to 
happen. One of them is the issue of inequality and the other one is the environment. Inequality 
has a big influence on China’s development because at a certain level it does influence the 
country’s stability which again influences its national strength and its economic growth. 
Growing inequality might lead to less stability and thus threaten China’s economic progress. 
Environment is closely related to inequality. China’s population might easily blame 
corporations on being responsible for environmental pollution because many reported 
accidents are caused by big companies. In combination with inequality this can lead to social 
unrest. From another point of view, if these accidents happen too often or if they have severe 
consequences like in the Songhua incident in Haerbin that threatens stability too.  
 
5.1.1 Energy 
One of the most essential requirements for China’s economic motor to keep on running is 
natural resources. China is a big country with the highest population in the world. The 
motorization of China has increased quickly due to an increase in disposable income of city 
dwellers. Additionally the constant stream of goods from its producing entity to its consuming 
entity, as well as the stream of imported goods and the stream of goods to export, requires fuel 
in its transportation process. Due to China’s unfortunate situation it does not harbor too much 
natural oil, thus there is a need for importing it (Smil 1998).  
   
   
  18 
Since 1993 China is a net importer of crude oil. In 2004 the Chinese need for oil was at six 
million barrels per day (about 960 million litres), with 40% coming from imports (Leverett & 
Bader 2005: 189). Looking back shows us that China has already been a long way. In 1990 it 
barely imported 21 million barrels. 1996 saw the import of 160 million barrels (Smil 1998: 943) 
and in 2004 it was up by 384 million barrels. So one can clearly state that there is a strong 
growth tendency. 
The other question that should be answered is regarding the prospects of oil consumption. 
According to Leverett and Bader, there will be 130 million cars in China by 2030, which 
would secure a substantial increase in further oil imports. A further planned economic growth 
on average of 7.5% in the 11th Five-Year Plan shall enable enough growth in industry which in 
turn will lead to growth in transport and so on (Hagiwara 2006: 2). In order to secure the 
needed energy supply, China cooperates with Venezuela, Angola, Saudi Arabia and Iran 
(Shichor 2008). 
This shows that China is in clear need of oil resources all over the world that it can import in 
order to quench its thirst for oil in order to keep its economy running. This leads to another 
issue which is intertwined closely with oil: security. 
 
5.1.2 Environment 
The still-lasting economic growth of the Chinese economy, that has started 30 years ago, has 
strained the environment very much. Not only is China’s energy demand rising, which means 
that import and consumption of oil are increasing. There are two essential effects that are not 
beneficial. One is the influence on climate change, a topic that China has to deal with as well. 
The other point is its negative impact on people who live in those polluted areas. As Stiglitz 
noted at a speech at the Peking University, China is about to become the world’s largest 
polluter. Stiglitz claimed that this is supposed to happen at the end of 2008 (Guo 2008).  
It is not only air-pollution that China is trying to deal with. There are two issues that revolve 
around China’s water: first of all there is not enough of it anymore and second some of it gets 
polluted by the industry (Webber et al 2008: 617). The lack of water has severe implications on 
farming in China as water intensive fruits and vegetables need it as a resource to grow. The 
absence of water or at least a scarcity means that prices are rising, which in turn leads to 
expensive end consumer prices. Polluted water on the other hand had a severe impact on the 
city of Haerbin when a chemical industry plant polluted the river Songhua in Haerbin in 2005. 
Thus water for people in Haerbin had to be brought by trucks and other means of transport as 
the normal pipe water could not be used anymore (BBC News, 23rd Nov 2005). 
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5.1.3 Inequality 
The Chinese development strategies aimed at making some people rich first, and then let all 
people share their wealth. By now, some are already very rich. As Stiglitz has pointed out, 
China’s Gini coefficient (0.47) has surpassed both that of India (0.31) and that of the United 
States (0.41) (Guo 2008). The inequality rose due to different reasons but urbanization and 
increased wage levels in cities compared to rural areas is one of them. Furthermore, that 
income gap has also been connected with education and the lack thereof. Another point that 
adds to the enormous income gap is strong difference of economic activity and wage levels at 
the coastal regions and central regions. Lacking even further behind are the western regions of 
China. So there is an obvious difference in wages, with western regions having the lowest 
wage levels, followed by central Chinese provinces and led by coastal regions. Not only wages 
are higher, but due to investment there is in general more money available at the coastal 
regions and well-established trading centres. Additionally the strong competition on the job 
market adds to comparatively low wages and no reasons for substantial increase with little or 
no education.  
 
5.1.4 Security 
The rise of China with all its economic advantages does not come without any burden. Its sheer 
size and economic power coupled with a perceived lack of transparency tends to alarm other 
nations. An increased number of reports regarding China’s growth and its inherent military 
danger have appeared lately e.g. Smith (2003) and Pillsburry (2007). They show that the US’ 
concern regarding China’s military activities is growing. This in response serves as a good 
argument for US military build-up3, which in turn leads to concern among Chinese leadership, 
thus also engaging on a path of military build-up.  
Many nations seem to be uncertain whether China is rising peacefully or whether it is building 
up its forces in preparation of strategic expansions (Newmyer 2009: 206). One nation that is 
very suspicious regarding China’s current ambition within the international community is the 
US. While it does increase its cooperation with China in many areas, many military people 
warn about China’s rise. Some high-ranking military officers even suggest that there might be 
a type of space Pearl Harbor in the future which would lead to an ultimate defeat of the US 
(Worden & Shaw 2002: 32).  
                                                 
3
 There have been two incidents on false reports. One was regarding an alleged try of China to blind US satellites 
which never happened. Another one was regarding a parasitic satellite that never existed (Kulacki & Wright: 
2005). Furthermore the Chinese satellite shoot down in 2007 was another reason for increased funding of US-led 
efforts to counter Chinese space weapon programs.  
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As has been demonstrated in chapter 2, competitive behavior often is a major reason for 
military build-up. Analyzing the size and action radius of US troops in South East Asia, this 
means that a rising China collides with a power-projecting US (Lei 2008: 144). When China is 
building a new naval base in Pakistan or developing new anti-ship missiles that manage to hit 
ships, then this can lead to questionable reports inside the government as was demonstrated by 
Kulacki and Johnson-Freese (Kulacki & Johnson-Freese: 2008). 
From a diplomatic point of view, it is questionable whether China’s deal with Iran and North 
Korea on proliferation of ballistic missile technology is desired or not (Shichor 2008). So on 
one hand there seems to be a direct clash of military spheres of influence in the South East 
Asian region, while on the other hand remains the question of China’s intentions.  
 
5.1.5 Innovation 
A lot of China’s economic growth in the recent years was based on export. China exported a 
lot of cheap goods that are labor-intensive, and imported technology wherever it was deemed 
useful or necessary. This behavior made China dependent on the West as it would copy new 
technology and at the same time copy institutions while what might help the most would be 
home-grown innovation (Stiglitz 2007).  
There are various reasons that support increased innovation capacity for China. As mentioned 
in chapter one on development, innovation processes both strengthen a country’s economy and 
a country’s overall strength i.e. military strength. Furthermore, the import of technological 
products that have been through a lengthy research and development process can be expensive. 
In order to avoid these expenses and the related knowledge transfer process, it becomes a 
necessity for China to improve its innovation level. On the other hand, there are certain key 
technologies that are important for the current economic growth e.g. microcomputers, resource 
exploitation technology, environmental technology, etc. Some of these technologies are 
imported through Western companies that are trying to develop the Chinese market and thus 
set up branch offices and supply this knowledge. However, this is not genuine Chinese 
technology. Through treaties like ITAR these companies could be forced to withdraw. Thus for 
constant indigenous innovation Chinese companies seem to be required. China’s fast 
development requires innovations in many areas, which is one of the reasons why China is 
pushing innovation in such a strong way (Guinet et al 2007).  
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5.1.6 Proposed solutions 
Many existing issues have corresponding items either in the current Five-Year Plan or in the 
MLP. Thus the current section looks at these plans and highlights a few examples of China’s 
development goals. 
In order to tackle the energy issue that China is facing, the broad strategy proposed in the 11th 
Five-Year Plan is to save more energy. On one hand the current Five-Year Plan proposes to 
reduce the energy consumption wherever possible but mainly in energy-intensive industries. 
On the other hand there are also a few points relating to the development of technology that 
requires less energy. This would have two advantages: one would be to suggest a transition 
from industry to the service sector; the other advantage is to reduce carbon dioxide emissions. 
The plan suggests that the industrial sector should cut energy consumption by 20%. The fact 
that energy saving has not even been mentioned in the 10th Five-Year Plan shows its 
importance has increased substantially (Hagiwara 2006: 2).  
The complementary method in the plan is to increase energy efficiency. That way factories 
create the same value as before by using less energy i.e. the macro-economic measurable 
remains the same while the amount of energy consumed, an environmental pollution indicator, 
is decreased (Lam 2005). A combination of these two policies shall eventually lead to the 
proposed goal of cutting down the consumption to 80% from the current level. The 
implications of this policy for both the environment and for the industry are heavy.  
As mentioned above, China also has water shortages. In order to deal with this issue, the 
current plan has a binding goal, which means that the government is responsible for fulfilling 
this, to reduce the water consumption per unit of industrial added value for 30%.  The 10th 
Five-Year Plan had no comparable element (Hagiwara 2006). 
 
The sixth chapter of the 11th Five-Year Plan is devoted to the construction of an 
environmental-friendly society that saves natural resources. One of its passages reads as 
follows: 
 
强化能源节约和高效利用的政策导向，加大节能力度。通过优化产业结构特别是降低高耗能
产业比重，实现结构节能；通过开发推广节能技术，实现技术节能；通过加强能源生产、运
输、消费各环节的制度建设和监管，实现管理节能。突出抓好钢铁、有色、煤炭、电力、化
工、建材等行业和耗能大户的节能工作。加大汽车燃油经济性标准实施力度，加快淘汰老旧
运输设备。制定替代液体燃料标准，积极发展石油替代产品。鼓励生产使用高效节能产品。
(Zhongguo Shiyiwu Guihua Gangyao 2006: 35) 
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Strengthen orientation towards the policy of highly-efficient energy use and reduction of energy 
consumption. Increase the degree of energy saving. By reducing energy consumption in energy-
intensive industries, a structural energy saving shall be accomplished. A technology-based reduction 
shall be achieved through the development and promotion of energy-saving technology. The 
establishment of a system that overlooks and controls production, transport and consumption of 
energy shall achieve a reduction in overhead costs. A strong emphasize on saving energy will be set 
in industrial areas like steel, non-ferrous metals, coal, electricity, chemical industry, construction 
materials, etc and high-quantity consumers. Define a fuel-consumption standard for cars and 
accelerate the process of eliminating old transport equipment. Define a standard for the replacement 
of solid fuel and push the development of substitute products for crude oil. Encourage the production 
and usage of highly-efficient energy saving products.  
 
This development goal directly relates to the energy consumption issue that the PRC has built 
up due to its constant economic growth. It shows that China tries to reduce its energy 
consumption on one hand, especially in those industries that consume most of the energy. That 
also relates with goals in the current Five-Year Plan to reduce the amount of energy needed for 
the production in one industrial unit. Energy-efficient usage has become an essential part. 
Another problem that is slightly shown here is the high pollution that happens through the 
firing of coal. The attempt to introduce a new standard or a new system that offers incentives to 
use other energy sources than solid ones may prove useful in reducing the harmful pollution 
created by using coal. 
While the issue of inequality has risen in China, the current Five-Year Plan does contain many 
goals and statements regarding potential solutions to this problem. One important barrier that 
has been in place for a long time is that of the medical system. The access is not granted for 
everybody and it is simply expensive. Chinese people so far had to save a lot of money in a 
preventive way in case a disease struck them or their family members. With the advent of the 
financial crisis the central government decided on a new system that was to be started in the 
bigger cities. That system is basically a social security system for the people in the city. 
However, chapter ten of the 11th Five-Year Plan writes on page 58 the following regarding 
China’s medical system: 
 
按照政事分开、管办分开、医药分开、营利性与非营利性分开的方向，坚持政府主导、社会
参与、转换机制、加强监管的原则，建立符合国情的医疗卫生体制，为广大群众提供安全方
便有效合理的公共卫生和基本医疗服务。(Zhongguo Shiyiwu Guihua Gangyao 2006: 58) 
 
In this way we create a medical system according to the national needs in order to increase public 
hygiene and to provide basic medical service in a safe, convenient, efficient and rational way. This 
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shall happen by adhering to the following principles: separation of political and professional issues, 
separation of supervision and management, separation of prescription of drugs and the sale thereof 
as well as separation of profitable and unprofitable activities. In doing so, we maintain governmental 
guidance, social participation, transformational mechanisms and strengthened supervision as guiding 
principles.  
 
Resolving issues in the Chinese health system has been an important goal for a while. This 
point tries to resolve two issues that have been eminent in the Chinese health care system. One 
issue is to enable wider access to the health care system so that people can be treated even 
though their financial resources are scarce. On the other hand it tries to tackle problems of 
similar people being responsible for drafting policies and for managing some medical 
institutions that are supposed to follow these policies. The separation of government and 
business, the separation of supervision and management tries to deal with this problem. If 
those who create the governmental framework of rules and policies in the medical sector are 
also those who are responsible for managing certain hospitals, then filing claims becomes a 
dead-end as there will hardly be any response from the bureaucratic system. Separating these 
responsibilities shall eventually lead to a system that is more open for feedback and less prone 
to covering up scandals. 
The question arises whether this goal has a measurable attached to indicate fulfilment or not. In 
this case the goal is to increase the coverage of the new rural cooperative medical care system 
from 23.5% at the end of 2005 to a full 80% at the end of 2010 (Hagiwara 2006: 2). 
Furthermore it is important to note, that this is a binding goal within the 11th Five-Year Plan. 
 
The next excerpt describes a goal regarding compulsory education in rural areas: 
 
着力普及和巩固农村九年制义务教育。对农村义务教育阶段学生免收学杂费，对其中的贫困
家庭学生免费提供课本和补助寄宿生生活费。按照明确各级责任、中央地方共担、加大财政
投入、提高保障水平、分步组织实施的原则，将农村义务教育全面纳入公共财政保障范围，
构建农村义务教育经费保障机制。(Zhongguo Shiyiwu Guihua Gangyao 2006: 13) 
 
Focus on promoting and consolidating the 9-year compulsory education in rural areas. Tuition and 
other fees are waived for students who are in the compulsory education stage. Furthermore, those 
pupils among them from poor families shall get their text books for free and boarding students 
receive a living allowance. The principles are that there is clear responsibility at all levels, the central 
and local governments share tasks, financial inputs are increased, the guarantee level enhanced, and 
the implementation is executed step by step. Based on these princples, the costs of rural compulsory 
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education will be fully covered by public funds, and further mechanisms to ensure funding for rural 
compulsory education will be built.  
 
While education is a highly appreciated commodity in China, it is also a commodity that is 
often hard to access. Especially in poverty stricken areas not ever child has the opportunity to 
attend classes and thus does not get a chance to advance in the highly competitive education 
system that China has fostered in the last thirty years. In connection with the slogan of 
“building the new countryside”, the central government tries to improve the existence of 
schools and access to them. By doing so, it improves the opportunities for those people who 
dwell in rural areas. While the amount of money necessary to secure basic education for these 
children might be comparably low, the gains within the population can be pretty high: a feeling 
that there is a government that not only cares about those who are rich and important but also 
about those with less financial resources. In this way the idea to improve education in rural 
areas contributes to tackling the rising challenge of inequality. On the other hand side China 
has also put a big focus on innovation. An improved education system and an increased 
number of children most likely means that more people get better education, finally enabling 
more people to come up with innovations that are useful for their country. 
Another important issue that has been outlined before is China’s technological dependency on 
other countries. In order to strengthen its independence in all matters that are important to 
China, the crucial subject of innovation has been chosen as a key goal in the current 
development plans. Chapter seven of the current Five-Year Development Plan focuses on the 
development of science, technology and human resources. Science and technology in particular 
are seen as driving forces for the further development of the country. However, in order to 
develop quickly and achieve breakthroughs in relevant areas China also needs the human 
talents that have the capacity to make these things happen. The current Five-Year Plan notes 
the following in regard to innovation:  
 
把科技进步和创新作为经济社会发展的重要推动力，把发展教育和培养德才兼备的高素质人
才摆在更加突出的战略位置，深化体制改革，加大投入，加快科技教育发展，努力建设创新
型国家和人力资本强国。(Zhongguo Shiyiwu Guihua Gangyao 2006: 42) 
 
Make scientific and technological progress as well as innovation the main driving forces for social 
and economic development. Put the training of top-talents with both moral and professional 
competence at a more prominent strategic position. Intensify the structural reforms and increase the 
investment. Accelerate the development of scientific and technological education. Strive to build an 
innovative country with well-developed human resources.  
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This shows very well how science and technology fit seemingly together with new talents who 
have the capacity and the will to achieve what is needed for their country. While nothing new, 
the weight that is put upon science and technology as those factors that will drive the 
economy’s development is important to understand. 
 
In the first section of chapter seven on the acceleration of independent innovation, there is 
more information revealed as to which areas China’s general technological and scientific 
development focus will concentrate on:  
 
加强基础研究、前沿技术研究和社会公益性技术研究，在信息、生命、空间、海洋、纳米及
新材料等领域超前部署，集中优势力量，加大投入力度，力争取得重要突破。适应国家重大
战略需求，启动一批重大科技专项，在能源、资源、环境、农业、信息、健康等领域加强关
键技术攻关，实现核心技术集成创新与跨越。实施重大产业技术开发专项，促进引进技术消
化吸收再创新。(Zhongguo Shiyiwu Guihua Gangyao 2006: 42) 
 
Strengthen basic research, research in cutting-edge technology and research of technology for public 
welfare. Achieve great break throughs by concentrating superior forces and increase the investments 
in information technology, life sciences, aeronautics, marine, nanotechnologies and new materials 
and other areas ahead of deployment. In response to the strategic requirements of the country, 
special programs for science and technology should be started. Increase research in key technologies 
in the fields of energy, natural resources, environment, agriculture, information technology and 
health. Realize core technology innovations and a leap forward. Implement key projects for the 
development of industrial technology. Promote digestion, absorption and re-invention of imported 
technology.  
 
 
It is important to note that both energy and natural resources are among those key technology 
fields that China wants to increasingly develop. It also lists new materials, life sciences and 
aeronautics. The needs presented in the previous sections make it obvious that China needs to 
accelerate its development either in the realms of energy efficiency, thus the projects listed 
here, or in the realms of energy exploitation e.g. oil extraction in the deep seas which is a 
project that has been listed in the MLP. Information technology is seen as a general 
infrastructure technology that is of increasing importance while life sciences is deemed a 
technology that helps China to deal with its vast population and the task to feed them. China’s 
increased research intentions in agriculture and health clearly link to these needs. 
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While it is useful to understand the current goals, sometimes it is more informative to look at 
specific measures that China takes in order to implement these goals. One of these specific 
steps is to implement a tax system based on incentives for those companies that are willing to 
increase their budget for research and development. It also claims to draft other fiscal policies 
in order to increase the level of innovation: 
 
实行支持自主创新的财税、金融和政府采购政策，引导企业增加研发投入。发挥各类企业特
别是中小企业的创新活力，鼓励技术革新和发明创造。(Zhongguo Shiyiwu Guihua Gangyao 
2006: 44) 
 
Implement tax, finance and purchasing policies that support independent innovation and lead to 
increased investment in research and development in enterprises. Develop innovation capacity in all 
kinds of enterprises, particularly the small and medium-sized ones. Encourage technological 
innovation and new inventions.  
 
It is important to note how the current Five-Year Plan focuses in a strong way on innovation 
and self-reliance. In general there is an observable trend to achieve the capacity of realize most 
needed innovations alone and to become independent from other countries. This part here 
shows the importance and scale of this goal as even fiscal policies will be drafted as supportive 
measures. In combination with China’s energy needs and its environmental issues, this seems 
to be a promising development in allowing China to deal with many of its current challenges. 
Page 68 of the current Five-Year Plan also has a listing on key projects that receive financial 
support from the central government. Knowledge and innovation projects are among them. 
Furthermore, it also lists the attempt to industrialize high-tech areas. Projects that aim at saving 
energy are listed, too (Zhongguo Shiyiwu Guihua Gangyao 2006: 68). Out of five projects that 
are listed, one of them relates to innovation. Two others relate to changes in the rural areas and 
one focuses on the improvement of public service. Thus it is clearly visible that innovation is 
of substantial importance in the current Five-Year Plan. 
Summing it all up, the current Five-Year Plan shows that that environmental issues, the closing 
or narrowing of the rich and poor divide as well as innovation are all essential to China’s 
current development. Furthermore they are accompanied by issues of energy security. What 
has not been demonstrated here but nevertheless proved to be of importance is the rural areas, 
the improvement of supplying their basic needs and the improvement of living standards in 
those areas. The general direction of the projects is mixed. One part of the current Five-Year 
Plan is very progressive and seeks to increase China’s overall strength, better its economy and 
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strengthen its capacity to deal with its own issues in various areas. Another part is concerned 
with improving equality, with creating or improving basic services necessary for every citizen. 
Overall there is a perceived balance of tackling new challenges ahead with China’s increasing 
importance in the international community and reducing issues that undermine internal 
political stability. 
What follows underneath is a zooming in on the development plans in three different 
perspectives. The first layer shows which space projects and plans are incorporated in the 11th 
Five-Year Plan itself. First this part shows projects with a focus on space e.g. the earth 
observation system that China wants to develop. Then it considers other goals in the 11th Five-
Year Plan that might benefit considerably by support from space projects. 
The next level looks at the 11th Five-Year Plan for space development. This plan takes the 
input, goals and strategic direction from the 11th Five-Year Plan and incorporates them in a 
plan that only focuses on space. This is the finest observation layer offered in my research. 
The last analysis layer takes a look at the mid- and long-term plan for scientific and 
technological development from 2006 until 2020. This plan offers a guideline to all scientific 
and technological developments until 2020, thus its broad strategy can have influence on the 
direction that the space program takes or vice versa. This last analysis layer shows China’s 
long-term plans for its space program. Merging the data of these three layers offers an insight 
into what is planned and creates a harmonious picture of China’s future in space. 
 
5.2 Space-related goals in the 11th Five-Year Plan 
 
This section looks at the key goals in the 11th Five-Year Plan for Space Development which 
covers the time from 2006 to 2010. While China has extensive space capacities in various 
fields only the manned space program, the lunar exploration, the Earth observation program 
and a big-scale astronomy telescope are mentioned. There are no details offered as to how far 
these projects need to progress until the end of the current Five-Year Plan. These projects are 
mentioned in chapter seven in the context of China’s ambitions for innovation. Additionally it 
should be mentioned, that there are certain space-related endeavors that are not listed in these 
plans but still underway. As far as information is available, they are examined in chapter six, 
which deals with the current capacity of the Chinese space program.  
Space development has been given importance in the current Five-Year Plan: three space 
technology programs are among the fourteen key science and technology programs that China 
wants to develop. Other projects listed among these fourteen projects are the indigenous 
development of big-scale aeroplanes and all the technologies that are needed to produce it 
   
   
  28 
independently. Another essential project is the development of new drugs that are competitive 
on the market. While it has been demonstrated in chapter 5.1 how important environmental 
issues and energy security are for China, only one project relates to environmental issues and 
two projects related to energy safety. Seen in this light, space has been given a relatively high 
priority in the area of technological innovation (Zhongguo Shiyiwu Guihua Gangyao 2006: 42). 
 
高分辨率对地观测系统开发基于卫星、飞机和平流层飞艇的高分辨率先进观测技术，建立对
地观测数据中心及重点应用系统。 (Zhongguo Shiyiwu Guihua Gangyao 2006: 43) 
 
Develop a high-resolution earth observation system based on satellites, cutting-edge observation 
technology with high-resolution for airplanes and stratospheric air ships. Furthermore, construct a 
data center for earth observation data and key applications. 
 
This relates directly to China’s extensive development of both its weather observation system 
Fengyun and its remote sensing satellites of the Yaogan class. In both cases the development of 
sensors with higher resolution are essential to offer better data which then leads to more 
accurate predictions and observation data that can be processed further. As of summer 2007 
China had nearly finished a new data processing center, the National Satellite Meteorological 
Centre, of the Chinese Meteorological Administration in Beijing.4  
 
载人航天与探月工程突破航天员出舱活动以及空间飞行器交会对接重大技术，建立具有一定
应用规模的短期有人照料、长期在轨自主飞行的空间实验室。开发月球探测关键技术，建立
月球探测工程系统。 (Zhongguo Shiyiwu Guihua Gangyao 2006: 43) 
 
The manned space program and the lunar exploration program shall achieve a break through in 
extravehicular activities and in key technologies for spacecraft docking maneuvers. The program 
shall develop a big-scale space laboratory that can fly independently in long term but that shall be 
tended by taikonauts in the near future. Develop the key technologies for surveying and exploring 
the Moon and start a project to do so. 
 
This part shows the next steps in the Chinese manned space exploration program very clearly 
and they are aligned with what has been observed in other space exploration programs. First 
China will develop the necessary technologies to execute docking maneuvers between 
spacecraft. Shenzhou-8 and Shenzhou-9 are planned to execute the first attempts. Additionally, 
there are Chinese plans for a space station. Around the Chinese New Year Chinese Central 
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 The author visited this facility during a summer course with the International Space University. 
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Television has shown models of a planned Chinese space station, also called Tiangong-1. The 
current development plans also require that the space station has a clear focus on applications. 
Thus it seems that the Chinese, in accordance with other sub-programs in their space program, 
focus on pragmatism and design their space station with a focus on a return of investment in 
mind.  
The goal regarding lunar exploration on the other hand is not that precise on what exactly 
should be done. It states that a project to explore and survey the Moon shall be developed. That 
correlates with the development of Chang’e-I.  
The only other space-related project that is mentioned is a big-scale telescope for astronomy. 
That correlates with China’s development of a new high-tech telescope which is called 
LAMOST and has been finished recently (SpaceDaily, 6th Nov 2008).  
Overall the current Five-Year Plan contains some very ambitious space projects. It needs to be 
understood that a lot of infrastructure required to realize these plans is not mentioned. The 
spaceport that China builds in Hainan is necessary for deploying parts of the Chinese space 
station. While those projects mentioned might not seem that many, other projects they require 
are comparatively big in scale and expensive in terms of expenditure.  
The opposite of big-scale applications are those new sensors that China is trying to develop for 
their own remote sensing satellites in order to build that high-resolution Earth observation 
system mentioned in their plans. These sensors require substantial progress in China’s 
scientific research. In case China does not advance in these areas, its chances to import this 
equipment are low because of its classification as national security related product and export 
limitations through treaties like ITAR. Additionally, China’s satellite navigation system 
Beidou is not mentioned at all. This system has a big influence because of its implications both 
for civilian users and national security.  
 
5.3 Other space-supported goals in the 11th Five-Year Plan  
 
Section 5.2 showed which goals in the 11th Five-Year Plan relate to space. The projects listed 
in this section are by their nature not related to space, however, space tools have been proven 
to be of use for their solution. For a better understanding on which space tools can help in 
solving terrestrial problems please see UN Programme on Space Applications (UN OOSA 
2006).  
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1) Urbanization is a huge issue 
The current development plan strongly focuses on the further development of existing 
cities and the creation of new ones in order to create living spaces for people from rural 
areas(Zhongguo Shiyiwu Guihua Gangyao 2006: 35). This means a further migration 
stream from rural areas to the cities. Due to the amount of people involved, it supposedly 
would help China to structure the expansion of existing cities and coordinate the 
development of new ones. Ideally new regions will be thoroughly planned and the city 
growth will be surveyed in regular intervals. Although there is no direct need for space 
tools they do offer a good overview on a city’s growth over time, due to their repeating 
intervals there is no additional work needed in order to obtain that data, and it helps 
regional authorities to control what local authorities do. 
 
 
2) Accelerating development of science and education  
Building various research centers will definitely help to develop more indigenous research 
capacity. China wants to increase the amount and quality of researchers and engineers 
available within the country. Furthermore, the current plan states to increase China’s self-
sufficiency. It wants to become a country that does not need to rely on others no matter 
regarding talents, technological capacity or its ability to deal with its own problems 
(Zhongguo Shiyiwu Guihua Gangyao 2006: 42). 
 
China’s goal to develop some first class research institutes fits together with its space 
development activities. Space in this case is not the tool to achieve their goal but through its 
image it does help China to increase its research capacity eventually, by attracting good 
students to natural science careers. This attraction is achieved through the fostering of an image 
of technological success and progress. When in 2003 China launched its first manned mission, 
university areas contained many messages of national pride and support5. The image of space 
as a high-tech frontier does have many competitors that woe for talent as well but in terms of 
attracting young people to technical studies space can be relatively strong, especially given the 
media coverage it experienced in China since the first manned flight. This media promotion 
and celebration of China’s scientific and technological success has continued with China’s 
lunar exploration program Chang’e. 
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 As experienced by the author. 
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As has been pointed out in section 5.1.6, innovation and education are two key issues in this 
current Five-Year Plan. All these issues strongly relate to space because it is a very eminent 
field of high technology. It is an example of a frontier technology that is enabling human kind 
to explore another frontier. In this way it could be argued that space does contribute to 
fulfilling China’s goals in regard to attracting talents and developing new technologies in order 
to both deal with their current issues and start to develop home-made key technology. The 
event of the space age has attracted many capable people in the US and other places of the 
world towards studying scientific and technical subjects. However, in terms of specific 
numbers it is one of those subjects that are hard to measure. While it is probably human nature 
to be attracted by new breakthroughs and be part of something that seems to have great 
prospects in the future, it can not be claimed to be a general pattern that all humans follow.  
Whether space-based solutions will be utilized in order to tackle these goals will eventually 
depend on availability, accessibility and the cost-benefit ratio of these tools. Another issue that 
has often been encountered in workshops of the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs 
(UN OOSA) is a lack of awareness in decision makers. This means that although a country 
already has certain capabilities and the responsible entity tries to promote them, other entities 
do not have enough or nearly no knowledge about it, thus sticking to conventional means for 
solving an existing problem.6 
 
5.4 Key goals in 11th Five-Year Plan for Space Development 
 
While sections 5.2 and 5.3 pointed out which goals exist in the current Five-Year Plan that 
relate either fully or partially to space, this section has a closer look at a document that only 
focuses on space: the 11th Five-Year Plan for Space Development. This plan contains the most 
important steps that China’s space industry should implement between 2006 and 2010. 
 
In general the 11th Five-Year Plan for Space Development wants to strengthen the whole 
Chinese space endeavor. The quality of products of the Chinese space industry and customer 
service quality shall be improved. Internally the capacity for self-sufficient innovation and the 
industry’s overall development capacity shall all be improved. The space program shall bring 
economic and public benefits. Similar to the direction already pointed out in the 11th Five-Year 
Plan it also suggests a strong focus on building a pool of capable human resources in order to 
advance the Chinese space endeavor in the future.  
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 Personal talk with officers from UN OOSA headquarters in Vienna. 
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The overall goals of the space program are still to fulfill the needs of China’s developing 
economy, its national security and to serve the requirements of its scientific and technological 
progress, and the society’s progress (Hangtian Fazhan Shiyiwu Guihua 2007: 3). 
 
The following is a list of the key projects that China has to tackle:  
 
1) Manned space program  
It is China’s dedicated goal to advance its manned space program. Manned space has become 
one of the key space projects that China maintains at the moment. So far China has already 
successfully launched seven missions and tested some essential techniques for future missions.  
The current plan states to develop the capacity for space walks and to handle spacecraft 
docking in space. On the long term the goal is to establish a manned space station for 
conducting experiments in space (Hangtian Fazhan Shiyiwu Guihua 2007: 6). 
 
2) Lunar exploration 
The focus of the 11th Five-Year Plan for Space Development is set on the first stage of the 
lunar exploration program: sending a satellite to orbit the Moon. That satellite’s mission is to 
map existing substances and their distribution on the Moon’s surface as well as to complete a 
full survey of the Moon.  Furthermore it has to observe the space weather throughout its 
journey. 
While this satellite will be prepared and launched, a second mission with the goal of a soft 
landing on the Moon will be prepared. Parallel work will commence on the third stage of the 
lunar exploration: a sample return mission, which means to land a robot on the Moon, execute 
scientific exploration, collect soil samples and let it return to the Earth (Hangtian Fazhan 
Shiyiwu Guihua 2007: 6). 
 
3) Development of a high-resolution earth observation system 
The goal is to establish a high resolution Earth observation system that is composed of 
satellites, airplanes and stratospheric air ships. Furthermore that system will be aligned with the 
ground segment (Hangtian Fazhan Shiyiwu Guihua 2007: 7). 
 
4) Beidou satellite navigation system 
The goal is to optimize the currently existing Beidou-I system in order to satisfy national needs 
and fulfill neighbor country’s requests for that satellite navigation system. Furthermore, the 
deployment of the global satellite navigation system (Beidou-II) shall start in order to expand 
Beidou to a global satellite navigation system. At the same time its application in endeavors 
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like space traffic management, smart urban transportation systems and communication shall be 
promoted (Hangtian Fazhan Shiyiwu Guihua 2007: 7). 
 
5) Next generation carrier rocket 
Complete the research work on a carrier rocket with a 120 tons thrust rocket engine that runs 
on liquid oxygen and kerosene as well as a rocket engine with 50 tons thrust that runs on 
hydrogen and oxygen. The basic principles for the development of the new rocket are: no 
poisonous substances, no pollution, low cost, high reliability, high flexibility and safety. First 
research and construction steps of this new carrier rocket shall be executed according to these 
principles. Within the timeframe of the 11th Five-Year Plan the key technologies need to be 
mastered, the basic research and development finished and a carrying capacity of ten to twenty-
five tons for low earth orbit (LEO) and six to fourteen tons for GEO transfer orbit (GTO) 
achieved.  
 
The 11th Plan for Space Development is consistent with the 11th Five-Year Plan in the areas of 
innovation and strengthening the pool of human resources. Especially the development of role 
models who are capable of executing new missions from the beginning has been highlighted at 
various occasions. Except for Beidou, those other projects relate very much to what has been 
outlined in other plans. The plans for lunar exploration in this plan are already more precise 
than those offered by the current Five-Year Plan. Additionally to the tasks of mapping and 
surveying the lunar surface, a potential satellite also has the task of measuring the space 
weather. This relates directly to another science mission that China has planned: Kuafu, a 
mission to monitor space weather. The Plan for Space Development also shows that the 
deployment of Beidou-II shall continue, which will eventually lead to a full fledged global 
satellite navigation system, as opposed to Beidou-I which only offers regional coverage. In 
terms of terrestrial applications Beidou has direct implications for a so called smart urban 
traffic management systems that China plans to develop. Also in line with the goal of 
privatizing certain areas of China’s space industry, Beidou is an important project as it is 
supposed to be the driving force for these privatizations. This is similar to western countries 
where communication and satellite navigation systems have achieved to attract many private 
companies. 
Another key area in the Plan for Space Development is to improve the service level which 
essentially means to offer more space-based applications that are useful in dealing with specific 
problems on Earth. Examples include better meteorological satellites, satellites to search for 
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natural resources and satellites to monitor and prevent natural disasters. There is a clear focus 
on projects with a benefit for the Chinese society. Tele-education and tele-medicine are 
mentioned in this context as well. This means that China tries to implement programs that 
support students in remote areas to receive lectures via satellites. In remote areas this is often 
the only way to receive them. Tele-medicine is another example of applied satellite technology 
for satisfying terrestrial needs as Europe and Northern America have demonstrated.  
 
5.5 Space-related goals in the Medium- and Long-Term Plan for Scientific and 
Technological Development 
 
Section 5.2 has shown what the current Five-Year Plan contains in regard to space 
development, while section 5.4 has pointed out details in the current Five-Year Plan for Space 
Development. One plan that has not been analyzed yet is the medium- and long-term plan for 
scientific and technological development, which is referred to as MLP underneath. This plan 
outlines the Chinese development plans from 2006 until 2020 in the areas of science and 
technology. A few select examples shall show how the Chinese space program fits into what is 
about to happen in China after the 11th Five-Year Plan. 
The two projects directly related to space mentioned in the MLP are manned spaceflight and 
China’s lunar exploration program (Zhongguo Changqi Guihua Gangyao 2006: 36). There are 
no details in the MLP as to what these projects need or should achieve. This might seem vague 
or secretive however, there are many technological stepping stones that depend on each other. 
For example, in case the spaceport in Hainan is not finished by 2014, then there will be no 
opportunity to start deploying parts of the space station. Additionally, another project is 
required to deliver these parts of the space station: Changzheng-5. Thus we see there are two 
crucial projects that are still in progress which need to be completed successfully in order to 
enable the deployment of the space station. Furthermore Changzheng-5 contains considerable 
amount of research and development work which makes it very hard to predict the outcome, 
even if there is a time schedule that the responsible people wish to come true.  
These dependencies in concert with a Chinese aversion of publishing specific deadlines 
regarding their space program might partially explain why the MLP does not elaborate further 
on the specific goals of these programs. Technological risk in combination with the difficulty 
to predict when research in new areas can be concluded successfully, might account as well for 
the absence of more precise information.  
What follows is a selection of a few projects in the MLP that could be supported by space-
assets. Understanding that agriculture and environmental issues are essential to the MLP, it 
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should be pointed out here that remote sensing technology is used for crop yield prediction in 
the US while the Global Positioning System (GPS) is used extensively at farms that deal with 
huge areas in the US and Australia for vehicle control. In regard to environmental issues space 
offers the opportunity to gather global data over a long period of time. Furthermore, especially 
in terms of pollution spotting and monitoring there have already been a few select space 
applications. More information on how space can support environmental observation can be 
found on ESAs EnviSat homepage.   
One more specific goal in China’s MLP is to develop a smart urban traffic management system 
(Zhongguo Changqi Guihua Gangyao 2006: 36). A focus on urbanization in the 11th Five-Year 
Plan and the continuous growth of big Chinese cities like Beijing, Shanghai, etc require new 
solutions to inner-city transport issues.  
While China, as most of the rest of the world, currently tends to use GPS receivers for tasks 
that require satellite positioning, there is a strong focus in the Chinese government and the 
Chinese space industry to promote Beidou as a superior system, both for the sake of financial 
income and for independence as the reliance of critical civilian systems on a US-military 
controlled system is far from being independent. The idea to develop a smart urban traffic 
management system would solve existing issues on one hand and be a good project to position 
the Beidou system. This is also in line with intentions in the 11th Five-Year Plan for Space 
Development to strengthen the space industry by privatizing some areas and ensuring that 
private companies make use of available space technologies.   
Another goal in the MLP is to understand the different layers of Earth’s atmosphere and how 
they interact with each other (Zhongguo Changqi Guihua Gangyao 2006: 47). China wants to 
improve its understanding of nature, how atmospheric processes on different levels are 
interconnected and how they influence Earth’s climate. Due to current debates on climate 
change this topic is being researched by many researchers around the world. While having their 
own research data for future negotiations regarding steps to take in the fight of global warming, 
another advantage also would be to increase the understanding of implications for China’s 
agricultural sector.  
ESA has launched many missions with tasks related to environmental monitoring. Examples 
range from monitoring how the poles became smaller and smaller while others monitored 
ocean currents 7 . A Chinese example that proves the use of satellites in understanding 
atmospheric processes like the weather is the Chinese Fengyun satellite system that is 
responsible for delivering weather observation data. An advantage that satellites offer in 
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 More information is available at http://envisat.esa.int/ 
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comparison with conventional measurement systems is that they can scan the same spots in 
specific intervals and due to their location they also have an overview on very large areas. The 
combination of these two shall prove very helpful for future Chinese satellites that have the 
goal of environmental monitoring.  
Similar to one goal mentioned before the MLP lists to understand global changes and regional 
influences on page 49 as another goal (Zhongguo Changqi Guihua Gangyao 2006: 49). These 
two are comparable while the second one intentionally tries to understand regional influences 
and thus is more specific. It aims at understanding the effects global changes have on the 
weather in China and in its geographic region. This includes understanding interactions of 
oceans, continents and atmosphere as well as the change of the weather throughout time. 
Improved weather prediction systems should be created to utilize this improved understanding 
in specific applications.  
Weather monitoring satellites as the Chinese Fengyun system can offer data on regional and 
even global changes. Data gathered by these satellites is passed on to the scientists on the 
ground who evaluate the data and to create improved weather prediction models. 
The MLP suggests that there are quite a few applications that China wants to create and goals 
that it wants to achieve that could benefit from space-based applications. Some of them like the 
weather prediction system already do benefit from space-based assets in an extensive way due 
to the currently existing Fengyun satellites. Additionally to those goals that are outlined in the 
current MLP, there will most likely arise more needs that can be satisfied by space applications.  
 No matter how extensively space will be used as an asset for achieving set goals, manned 
spaceflight and lunar exploration are both in the MLP and they are long-term endeavors. The 
new carrier rocket for the Chinese space station, Changzheng-5 is supposed to be ready by 
2014, which is also the time the new spaceport in Hainan should be finished. Chang’e-II and 
Chang’e-III missions to the Moon are already underway and thus prove that in China’s case the 
perceived benefits from the space program outweigh the substantial investments it requires.  
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6. China’s space program  
 
While the previous chapters have laid the groundwork to understand the broad development 
direction China is embarking on, this chapter shall provide information on the current capacity 
of the Chinese space program. The understanding on China’s development goals on one hand 
and insights into the current state of key sectors of the Chinese space program shall offer all 
necessary information to understand the fit between current development needs and space 
technology as one tool. The reason why a detailed assessment of each of these six key areas 
follows is to understand how the current reality looks like. To know what is the Chinese space 
program is currently capable of doing is the minimum amount of information necessary to 
form a sound picture of how it can contribute to China’s development.  
This chapter analyzes six key areas and offers an overview on the capacity available in those 
areas and it tries to understand the political of these programs. These six key areas are: 
Shenzhou–the Chinese manned space program, space transportation systems i.e. Chinese 
launchers, remote sensing, Chang’e–China’s lunar exploration program, Beidou–the Chinese 
global satellite navigation system and telecommunication. 
 
6.1 Introduction to space 
 
This section shortly outlines some key concepts that shall help the reader to better understand 
the space environment. Data is drawn from a very useful publication: Physics of Space Security, 
which written as a technical guide for the policy community (Wright et al 2005). 
The recent importance of this topic has led to an increasing literature on the topic of the 
Chinese space program, often with a focus on the ground- and space-based weapon systems 
that China has developed. In order to focus on the facts it is thus important to understand what 
is possible and what is not possible in space. Although technical concepts like parasitic 
satellites might be possible in the future, there are too many technological barriers that still 
exist and they have not been proven. However, this science fiction concept appeared in the 
Department of Defense report on the Chinese military strength in the year of 2003.  
The laws of physics underneath try to prevent similar incidents from happening again. The 
understanding of the following basic space laws is indeed necessary to grasp the implications 
of China’s space program.  
Once a satellite is in space, it needs to circle around some bodies. The technical term for this 
that shall be used here is to be in orbit (around Earth, the Moon or the Sun). So a satellite that 
is in Earth’s orbit does not hover over a certain spot. It follows an elliptical path around Earth 
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as shown in Figure 1. Now the angle between the equator and the actual orbit of the satellite is 
called inclination. This angle is one of the factors that determine what can be observed on 
Earth. An angle close to 90 degrees means that through the constant spin of the Earth nearly all 
areas will be re-visited after a certain time span.  
Another essential concept is the relationship between height and the orbital period, the time it 
takes a satellite to revolve around Earth once. The relationship says that the higher the orbit of 
a satellite, the higher the orbital period (Wright et al 2005: 22). So satellites that are further 
away need more time to circle around Earth once. Another important point is the potential 
resolution a satellite can have on an area on the ground. The higher up it is, the lower the 
resolution that the observation data can possibly offer.   
 
Figure 1: Orbital planes in relation to Earth 
 
Another essential concept for space is the relationship between the geographic location of the 
spaceport and the orbit that a rocket can be put in. “For example, a rocket launched from the 
French Kourou launch site at 5.23° latitude could carry 20% more mass into a geosynchronous 
transfer orbit than could the same rocket from the Kazakh Baikonur launch site at 46° latitude. 
For a launch site at 70° latitude, the rocket could only carry half as much mass as one launched 
from Kourou” (Wright et al 2005: 83). 
Those concepts presented here have important consequences on every countries space program. 
The second relationship presented is also one of the key reasons for China’s attempt to build 
new spaceport on the island of Hainan.  
 
6.2 A necessary word on sources 
 
Due to dual-use issues of Space–related activities sources are sometimes hard to find. 
Depending on the object of interest there either are a variety of journals available on the 
internet or there is nearly no information i.e. on certain satellites. The Chinese pendant to 
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Elsevier and Jstor, named Chinese National Knowledge Infrastructure, was used in order to 
retrieve information. Information retrieval in general is possible at European academic 
institutions dealing with China. Most of the European research institutions in the field of 
Sinology or East Asian Studies only have access to the social sciences archives of this database 
though. Research on the space related part hence was conducted in China, where access at 
good universities in general is available to all journals, both of technical and social nature. 
Specific journals exist on a broad range from rocket propulsion via space medicine to 
electronic countermeasures for space warfare. All of these journals are accessible and do not 
carry any special restrictions. However, it still needs to be understood that although these 
journals exist, information on sensitive projects of the Chinese space program is not available 
in forms acceptable as sources here. For an overview on relevant journals see Fravel (2003: 75).   
Another critical issue is the quality and quantity of western sources available on this topic. 
There are not too many qualitative articles or books available from western scholars on this 
subject. Quality in this regard refers to articles that are written by authors who can read 
Chinese sources and who understand at least the basics of the space environment. What is 
available, are reports to US Congress e.g. the annual report on the military capabilities of 
China published by the Department of Defense (DoD)8, discussions in journals such as Space 
Policy and articles from experienced journalists who have been working in the field of 
aerospace and aeronautics for a long time for renowned online magazines like The Space 
Review or Space Daily.  
However, many of these sources are based on English data only, or fail to acknowledge the 
Chinese political system’s limitations in regard to democracy and transparency. Even more 
worrying is the fact that reports to US Congress have reportedly relied on false information 
(Kulacki & Johnson-Freese: 2008). Well-established and informed Western sources on this 
subject are Dean Cheng (Centre for Naval Analysis), Joan Johnson-Freese (Naval War College) 
and Gregory Kulacki (Union of Concerned Scientists).  
 
6.3 Capacity of the Chinese space program 
 
This section explores six areas of China’s space program: Shenzhou–China’s manned 
spaceflight program, space transportation systems, Beidou–China’s global positioning and 
                                                 
8
 A memo from the Union of Concerned Scientists showed the lack of quality in US DoD reports. Essentially it 
claimed that China had a dangerous space-weapon system only based on a Hong Kong newspaper article, which 
referred to a website containing fictional information (Kulacki, Johnson-Freese: 2008). Day has a good article on 
this (Day 2008, 23rd June). 
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navigation system, Chang’e–China’s lunar exploration program, telecommunication systems 
and remote sensing systems. 
Description of these essential parts of a space program each offer a basic overview on what has 
been achieved so far and which systems are in place. Furthermore there are sections that 
explore China’s motivation to run these programs, which is followed by an assessment on their 
capabilities in each of these areas. When applicable and available, a short reference section 
shows the interested reader opportunities that the Chinese capabilities can be measured against.  
Although there are technical details offered this thesis does not intend to analyze all technical 
information available but present an overview.  
 
6.3.1 Shenzhou–China’s manned space program  
 
Ever since John F. Kennedy’s famous Moon landing speech, men’s ancient dream to travel to 
other celestial bodies started to become reality. With the Apollo landings on the Moon on the 
20th of July 1969 humanity’s long dream to discover our universe became reality. However, 
the primary motivator for exploration was neither the Moon landing nor was it the wish to 
settle the Moon in order to expand the living space of mankind. The main driver was 
competition–it was the time of the Cold War and one of the most thrilling races in human kind 
had been turned loose: the race between the USSR and the United States to enter space and 
then land on the Moon.  
China was the third country to start a manned space program that successfully sent a human 
being into space. Plans for a manned space program have existed very early from 钱学森 (Qian 
Xue Sen), a Chinese scientist who was expelled from the US during the McCarthy anti-
communist campaigns. During the turbulent times of the 60s and 70s China was unable to live 
up to that dream. With China opening up in the 80s this dream turned closer although at that 
time still economic development was given priority. Finally in the 90s China started to focus 
on its manned space program again. 
 
Scope 
 
This section looks at all the Shenzhou missions that occurred so far and their achievements 
within the space program. It revisits major milestones of the space program and it draws a 
picture of what the Chinese manned space program is capable of doing at the moment.  
This section does not try to estimate the available budget for the Chinese space program. 
Furthermore it does not attempt to analyze technical implications of certain technologies that 
were either developed by Chinese scientists and engineers or transferred by Russian 
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counterparts (Jin 2004: 28). It also does not analyze the decision making structure within the 
manned space program and does not attempt to distinguish between civilian and military 
entities.  
 
Reference missions 
 
The first step for a manned space program is to start off with the development of missiles, 
which for most nations with rocket programs started during World War II with the V-2. After 
the war, all major developed countries continued to pursue their own further developments of 
that technology and finally came up with heavy lift vehicles that were able to send humans to 
space. Up until the Chinese development of their Chang Zheng (Long March) rocket, there 
were only two countries that had such a capacity: the US and the former Soviet Union.  
Once rockets are developed the space programs of the US and of the USSR started to develop 
rockets and spacecrafts that were able to launch one person into space and bring him back 
safely. The next stage is to develop a system that supports two or three people. When 
spacecrafts and rockets have proven their reliability, the next step is to develop a way so that 
spacecrafts can dock with each other in space. That is what is finally needed in order to set up a 
space station.   
Looking at the details after the basic rocket technology has been developed, countries generally 
begin with a few test missions, often deploying dummy space explorers equipped with a large 
array of environmental sensors: for atmospheric pressure inside the cabin, CO2 level, 
gravitational forces during lift-off and re-entry, etc. A potential substitute for that would be any 
animal that has a human-like physiology: the Americans used apes while Russians used dogs. 
Afterwards it is time for the first space heroes in the making, those who go first and are 
exposed to the biggest risk. After fine tuning, the conventional way is to develop systems that 
support two or three space explorers. Research activities for rendezvous maneuver follow 
which means that two spacecraft can dock with each other in space. This allows crew transfer 
from one vehicle to another, an essential thing for the establishment of a space station. Another 
requirement for running a space station is to handle extravehicular activities (EVA), also 
known as space walks. Depending on the goals and the strategies of the different countries, a 
space station might be the precursor for the exploration of other celestial bodies like the Moon 
or Mars or it may act as a laboratory in space.  
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The basics 
 
The progress of the Chinese manned spaceflight program can be described as follows. The first 
tests were unmanned. They were followed by tests with dummies to monitor the life support 
system itself and environmental data within the spaceship by ground control. In this flight 
every sub–system necessary for a successful manned mission was tested. After that, there was 
the world famous flight of Col. 杨利伟 (Yang Li Wei), the first Chinese taikonaut. The next 
flight already saw a crew of two people. Their development so far culminated in the last flight, 
Shenzhou-VII, which carried three people and one of them, 翟志刚  (Zhai Zhi Gang), 
conducted a spacewalk to test Chinese-made space suits.9 
 
 
Chinese spaceflights so far10 
   
  
Name 
   
 
Goal 
  
 
Achievements 
  
Shenzhou-I 
(1999) 
(1) Test of CZ-2A  
(2) Test of communication network 
(3) Test of re-entry module 
All tests successful 
Shenzhou-II 
(2001) 
(1) Test of propulsion system restart 
(2) Test of Zero-G experiments 
Successful 
Unknown 
Shenzhou-III 
(2002) 
(1) Test of life support system11   
(2) Test of escape system 
(3) Test of long term space capability (167 days)12 
Re-entry might have failed 
Shenzhou-IV 
(2002) 
(1) Test of real launch procedures 
(2) Simulation with dummy taikonauts  
Successful orbit change 
Successful deployment of 
solar panels 
Shenzhou-V 
(2003) 
(1) First Chinese manned flight Taikonaut successfully 
returned 
Shenzhou-VI 
(2005) 
(1) First flight with two taikonauts 
(2) Correct heavy g-load at start13 
(3) Convenience improvements e.g. better   
      shock absorbers, windows for re-entry, etc. 
(4) In-orbit change of module–testing of  spacecraft’s 
reaction to Taikonauts’  movements 
(5) Increased storage space of black box14 
Two taikonauts successfully 
returned 
All other tests successful 
Shenzhou-VII 
(2008) 
(1) Sample return via space walk 
(2) Micro satellite test navigation test  
  including ground based tracking test 
(3) Data relay satellite test 
(4) Solar panel unfolding process15 
(5) Beidou system involvement in landing16 
Space walk conducted 
successfully 
Sample return mission 
conducted successfully 
Data relay satellite conducted 
successfully 
Table 1: Shenzhou flights and their mission goals 
                                                 
9
 Actually a Chinese and a Russian space suit were deployed which can be interpreted as a security measure in 
order to ensure safety for the Taikonaut conducting the spacewalk. 
10
 A basic understanding of their mission can be obtained via SPACEWARN bulletin 
(http://nssdc.gsfc.nasa.gov/spacewarn/) 
11
 Huang & Sun 2005 
12
 Zaihang Wang 2002  
13
 According to Wang Yong Zhi, first chief designer of the Chinese manned spaceflight program (Huang & Sun 
2005)  
14
 Huang & Sun 2005: 2 
15
 Interview with chief designer of manned spaceflight program (Xu & Li 2008)   
16
 Quanqiu Dingwei Xitong 2008 
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According to the information available, Chinese missions saw no disaster so far. None of the 
taikonauts have died, which is good when compared with many victims that the Russian 
manned space program experienced in its early days. Furthermore, the development progressed 
quickly.   
So far the highlights of the Chinese space program include a spaceship that can hold up to three 
astronauts. China has also learned the essential technique of space walks that allows them to 
conduct in orbit repair missions. The high landing precision of their re-entry capsule also needs 
to be pointed out. Another milestone is China’s launch of a data relay satellite which allows for 
near real-time communication with their Shenzhou spacecraft. The last micro-satellite 
experiment on Shenzhou-7 showed that China is already able to control micro-satellites in 
fairly stable orbits around an orbital module. It also stunned the world because that micro-
satellite nearly missed the ISS without any prior international anticipation (Weeden 2008).   
Additionally to the technological level that China has achieved, it also utilized extensive 
diplomacy as it managed to acquire access to seven ground tracking stations outside China. 
That was necessary before the deployment of its data relay satellite in order to ensure nearly 
constant communication with their spacecraft (Zairen Hangtian Gongchengwang: 2009).  
 
Motivation 
 
Manned space programs are expensive and safety-critical in nature. Manned spaceflight is 
currently only mastered by three countries: US, Russia and China. This means mastery of this 
technology demonstrates a certain technological power and a stalwart political commitment. 
The two combined can lead to widely-acknowledged technical achievements like manned 
spaceflight which in turn can nurture an immense feeling of nationalist pride, which has great 
political value.  
This internal political motivation should be considered in the light of an increasing Chinese 
nationalism. A government that is constantly instilling the feeling of being special with terms 
like zhongguo tese, or Chinese characteristics（中国特色）, also needs certain achievements 
to prove this and thus maintain its own legitimacy.  
Here I would like to relate on what has been mentioned on competition in the introductory 
chapters relating to ideological competition. It can be a key driver for development. The space 
race between the former Soviet Union and the United States also can be seen in this context 
and technological development was benefiting strongly from that competition. Before China 
joined the elite club of nations with successful manned spaceflight projects, there were only 
two countries that had managed to achieve this: the US and Russia. By joining this club China 
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proved that it has the capacity to plan, develop and execute a very difficult project that requires 
a high technological level, political commitment and extensive financial resources. Doing so, 
China has proved that it can carry out technological projects so far were only executed by the 
US and Russia. This means that the Chinese system, and thus the Chinese way of living, is able 
to come up with the same results as the technologically advanced US and the former 
superpower Russia were able to reach.  
In order to assess political capital of the Chinese space program one needs to understand the 
international reaction on their space program’s achievements. Although manned space 
programs have suffered a loss of publicity in the last 40 years since the Apollo landings on the 
Moon, many countries still see a manned space program as a big technological challenge. The 
achievement to put a man into space and get him back safely shows the world that this country 
has enough money, political commitment, and technological know-how to do so. While Europe 
at the moment still does not have its own capacity to send its astronauts into space, there is 
often an issue with political commitment and thus funding due to the structure of the European 
Union. The US has severe challenges with the retirement of the space shuttle and the 
development of its Constellation program which both lead to political and financial issues. In 
comparison with these space-faring nations, China’s situation seems favorable. Thus it shows 
that China succeeds in allocating all those resources and in maintaining political commitment 
in comparison to other countries.  
A short look at how other countries perceive China’s space program should suffice to prove 
those assumptions above. It needs to be acknowledged that the success of the Chinese manned 
space project did not come out of nowhere. Its height was at a time when the Chinese economy 
was already one of the key topics in western political and business communities. However, the 
space program helped to build an international image of a powerful China–a China that is on 
its rise to a world power once again (Lin 2005: 41). It is in this context that it proves both to its 
citizens and the world community, that it has the technological capacity, the political will, and 
the resources to put people into space. It is this message and its implications that concern other 
countries in the world (Smith 2003, Pillsbury 2007).   
 
Assessment 
 
China is a member of the elite club of space-faring nations with manned space programs. It is 
one of three countries on this planet that have achieved political consensus, secured financial 
support and developed technical know-how necessary to do so. While this does not allow an 
assessment as such on the overall technological level of China’s space program, it shows that 
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China has a stable support for its program and also in correlation with other parts of its 
program, its progress is steady. 
More specifically, Chinese taikonauts have successfully executed a space walk on their 
Shenzhou-7 mission. Current research activities within the manned space program focus on the 
rendezvous maneuver of the next Shenzhou mission which will allow China to establish their 
own space station: Tiangong-1.  
The manned space program is contributing directly to the development goals that China has set 
because it is a goal of both the 11th Five-Year Plan and the MLP. The money required in 
combination with the fast progress, suggest the importance of this project on the political 
agenda. Furthermore, manned spaceflight is often perceived as a very difficult technological 
project that only advanced countries can master. China’s ability to successfully send three 
taikonauts into space, let one of them execute a space walk and return them safely to the Earth 
shows both the Chinese people and other countries on this planet that China is capable of 
successfully executing high-tech projects that only the US and Russia/Soviet Union have done 
before.  
Sustained political support is crucial for a space program because space projects do have 
longer life cycles than other high technology projects. The lack of political support thus would 
lead to a hibernating program that is both not progressing and in danger of loosing know-how 
as knowledge might get lost in that hibernation process. 
The Chinese manned space program has started in 1993 and it is still progressing. The Chinese 
New Year in 2009 saw the presentation of the Chinese space station, Tiangong-1, on Chinese 
national television. China’s information policy regarding their own manned space program has 
been clear so far: only show and announce what will happen for sure or what already has 
happened. Thus the presentation of the Chinese space station means that the leadership firmly 
intends to develop and deploy it. A space station requires technologically-challenging 
rendezvous maneuvers, medium and long-term life support systems and other difficult systems. 
Furthermore, it generally leads into a phase of sustained human presence in space for 
conducting psychological and physiological experiments for a better understanding of the 
effects of the space environment on humans. Thus it is reasonable to assume that the political 
support for manned space exploration in the next years is still secured. 
This strong political support is coupled with financial support. The continuous economic 
growth in China led to increasing incomes for the state which in turn enabled manned space 
exploration. It always needs to be understood that the research progress that precedes a space 
mission is lengthy and costly. In China’s case there have been technology transfer agreements 
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with Russia which supposedly have led to quicker progress. However, judging from Russia’s 
price tags for their Soyuz shuttle services to the international space station, this technology 
transfer was not cheap. In combination with the recent announcements that China made 
regarding the deployment of a space station, there does not seem to be any immediate danger to 
the funding of China’s manned space program.  
Although there is potential for dual-use applications in manned spaceflight, the cost benefit 
ratio in comparison with unmanned observation is not favorable (Day, 23rd June 2008). News 
and official positions sometimes point out the military potential China’s space program has, 
but on the whole there are other programs within the Chinese space program which are far 
more suitable for these needs. Taking this into consideration, the world-wide political climate 
towards China’s manned space program can be seen as mainly favorable from the key players. 
There needs to be a differentiation between those countries that welcome China as a new 
space-faring nation and thus adding to competition, allowing for new cooperations i.e. a 
German experiment on the latest Shenzhou mission. Although there are concerns that from a 
hierarchical point of view, the Chinese space program is run by the military. On the other hand 
it needs to be clarified that both the US and the former Soviet Union space program started like 
this and later separated into a civilian and into a military part. Furthermore, China also 
understood that this structure imposes certain restrictions and challenges on international 
cooperation opportunities (Day, 9th March 2009). One major international rejection for China’s 
manned space program has come from the US in regard to its participation on the ISS. The 
official point of view from the US was that this cooperation is not realistic due to military 
knowledge that might be passed on in case of cooperating. 
Another essential assessment factor is the technological progress that China has experienced 
during the build up of its space program. Data available suggests that China has studied the 
failures and challenges of other countries in detail from the very beginning (Qi et al. 2004: 6). 
This might have helped China to avoid any serious failures, at least according to the 
information that is currently available.  
While it is difficult to say how much space technology has been developed by Chinese 
researchers, it is possible to remark on the overall progress of the manned space program. Up 
to the first flight of a Chinese taikonaut and afterwards, the Chinese manned space program 
progressed constantly. The gap between missions has been about two years and this still holds 
true. The current preparations for the rendezvous maneuver might be seen in a different light as 
China had to start to manufacture Shenzhou capsules separately as the next mission requires 
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two Shenzhou capsules to fly at the same time thus it also needs parallel development of these 
two. Due to this, China also has to enlarge its production facilities. 
A break through that China also seems to have achieved is in the area of telecommunication. 
At the start of the Chinese space program China used a special type of ship called Yuanwang in 
order to communicate with their spacecraft (Harvey 2004). These ships are still in use at the 
moment but the deployment of a Chinese in-orbit data relay satellite has increased the coverage 
with Shenzhou vessels extensively and thus has eased communication overall. 
The last missions also saw some technological improvements that harbor potential for future 
missions. One notable change was the deployment of the Chinese Beidou system for the re-
entry. This has worked well and it seems that thus a global navigation satellite system has 
entered their manned space program as well. Additionally there was the deployment of a little 
companion satellite called BX-1 which orbited around Shenzhou. That satellite successfully 
backed away from Shenzhou and returned. At a certain point there was even a relative 
proximity to the ISS. Another point that China has already achieved is the capacity to execute 
space walks. While China has only conducted one space walk so far, this one has been a 
success. This means that the first stepping stone technology for space assembly operations has 
been developed and tested, and it works. In this field China once again showed that its focus is 
on achievement. The execution of the last Shenzhou mission saw the deployment of both a 
Russian space suit and a Chinese space suit. So China does not perceive the need to develop 
everything on its own but rather tends to use whatever is cheaper and more reliable. 
When talking about the technological progress there is one aspect that deserves attention: the 
quality of the Chinese Changzheng rocket. The rocket used for launches of Shenzhou, CZ-2F, 
never showed any problem since the very first flight in the manned space program. At this 
point the Russian-manned space program was much more unreliable in its early days than the 
Chinese space program. Chinese documents show that many previous disasters of other nations 
have been studied. However, as has been pointed out at various other places, this is according 
to information that is currently available. Relating to available rockets is also China’s space 
infrastructure. For their future plans to deliver a manned space station into orbit China is 
developing a new launch vehicle, Changzheng-5, and it is also building a new spaceport on 
Hainan island.  
The orbital module and the re-entry capsule are the second system that needs to be inspected 
when inquiring about the essential parts. There are no reports regarding any issues of the 
Shenzhou missions so far. However, pictures for all Shenzhou missions, including the pictures 
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of the re-entry capsule, were published except for Shenzhou-3, leading to an argument that 
something went wrong during that mission (Wade 1997). 
In general the Chinese space program shows one tendency worth mentioning: increased 
openness. In the early phase of the Chinese manned space program there was hardly any 
information available on what China plans and when it is going to happen. That situation was 
comparable to the early days of manned space exploration in the Soviet Union. With the 
successful flight of Col. Yang Liwei this seems to have changed. Although there are still no 
specific details regarding mission profiles, the news reported on the goals of the Shenzhou-7 
mission well ahead of time. Furthermore, the presentation of Tiangong-1 on Chinese television 
around the Chinese New Year in 2009 shows a hitherto unknown confidence in announcing 
details on missions that are still far into the future (Day, 9th March 2009). When comparing to 
the information available on the start of Shenzhou-V with China’s first taikonaut then there is a 
big change. This changing communication policy both hints at more confidence in the Chinese 
space program on one hand and also the readiness to communicate which plans China has in 
space towards the international community.  
 
6.3.2 Imaging satellites 
 
Information has always been a valuable commodity. Regardless of the global crop market or 
whether we investigate military expeditions, having information is always useful. Knowing the 
terrain is having the big picture, having an overview of the situation and being able to update 
this strategic information in short intervals is the key to understanding what is happening and 
necessary for checking what has occurred.  
This is the realm of imaging and remote sensing systems. These systems are designed to be the 
eyes and ears of a country. While early systems only worked during favorable weather 
conditions i.e. no clouds and only during day time, modern infrared sensors, on-satellite radar, 
etc. enable information gathering at all times.  
 
Scope 
 
This section deals with Earth-monitoring satellites. This includes imaging satellites in the 
visible, infrared, radar spectrum and weather satellites. This includes the current weather data 
collection system that China has. Furthermore, China’s fleet of remote sensing satellites of 
class Yaogan are included as well as CBERS satellites. 
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It does not deal with satellites that are specifically designed to monitor Earth’s magnetic field, 
ocean surface, ocean currents or any satellites for earthquake monitoring and prediction. 
Furthermore signals intelligence (SIGINT) or communication satellites are not dealt with at 
this place either. 
 
Reference 
 
Both Russia and the US maintain major satellite fleets for visual, infrared and radar 
observation. Their programs were developed at the dawn of the space age in order to get as 
much information about other countries as possible. Once their capacity was sufficiently 
developed they began to replace reconnaissance aircraft with satellites.  
The US keyhole system can be used as points of reference. Another reference system is Global 
Eye’s satellite fleet, which many readers might know for its high quality photographs 
accessible at Google Earth. 
 
Basic Data 
 
Satellite designation 
  
Function Launch date 
Beijing Galaxy 1 Remote Sensing 27.10.2005 
CBERS-2 Remote Sensing 21.10.2003 
CBERS-2B17 Remote Sensing 19.09.2007 
Feng Yun 1D Meteorological 15.05.2002 
Feng Yun 2B Meteorological 10.12.2000 
Feng Yun 2C Meteorological 06.12.2003 
Feng Yun 2D Meteorological 08.12.2006 
Feng Yun 2E Meteorological 23.12.2008 
Feng Yun 3A Meteorological 27.05.2008 
Huanjing 1A Environmental 05.09.2008 
Huanjing 1B Environmental 05.09.2008 
Jiang Bing 3A Military 01.09.2000 
Shiyan 1 Experimental 18.04.2004 
Shiyan 2 Experimental 18.11.2004 
Shiyan 3 Experimental 05.11.2008 
Yaogan 1 Remote Sensing 26.04.2006 
Yaogan 2 Remote Sensing 25.05.2007 
Yaogan 3 Remote Sensing 11.11.2007 
Yaogan 4 Remote Sensing 01.12.2008 
Yaogan 5 Remote Sensing 15.12.2008 
Yaogan 6 Remote Sensing 22.04.2009 
Table 2: List of Chinese remote sensing satellites18 
                                                 
17
 See Chang and Ma 2008: 15 
18
 See Union of Concerned Scientists 2009 
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Out of those six Yaogan class satellites currently in orbit, three possess synthetic aperture radar 
which enables them to operate both day and night. This is highly practical for issues of national 
security or when it comes to monitoring essential areas regarding China’s oil supply. What is 
important to note is that they are in sun synchronous orbits which basically allows them to 
monitor every place on Earth, although this depends on their location at a certain point in time. 
These satellites are not only taking images of China but have the capacity to cover many other 
areas.  
China’s 风云 (Fengyun) satellites are the base of their meteorological system. Currently the 
most up-to-date satellites are those of the Fengyun-3 series. They are designed for collecting 
atmospheric data for intermediate- and long-term weather forecasting and climate research. 
Satellites of the type Fengyun-4 are planned and the first of them are scheduled to be launched 
in 2013 (SinoDefence, 24th Sept 2008).  
CBERS is a cooperation of China and Brazil. The two satellites are used for disaster 
monitoring, agriculture and forest monitoring. They have charge coupled device and infrared 
scanners on-board as well as a wide-field imager. China and Brazil have a time-sharing scheme 
that allows one of the partners to use the satellite for a while and then pass control on to the 
other. This way there are clearly defined borders on when a country and its entities can use it 
(SinoDefence, 15th Oct 2008). 
The Chinese environmental satellites Huanjing-1A (Huanjing 环境) and 1B are part of a 
Chinese initiative for improved environmental monitoring. One global scan takes them two 
days. They are also part of the UN-Spider (space-based information for disaster management 
and emergency response) program which provides satellite data when countries are hit by 
disasters. First and foremost they will provide environmental data to China, which has been 
trying to catch up with its neglected environment in the last years.  
Apart from China’s autonomous remote-sensing capacity, it is important to understand their 
international deals. China is trying to setup a deal with Imagesat International in order to gain 
access to the Ofeq-5 based Eros system. As of October 2007 it seemed that the US was still 
opposed to that deal according to a Defense Daily article. The US government wants the 
Chinese to submit their target requests 24 hours before in order to scan them. Certain areas 
might be included in what seems a US imposed shutter control on the Israeli system (Aviation 
& Aerospace 2007). This deal with Imagesat would essentially allow China to bypass the US 
restrictions of ITAR and get access to this type of high-resolution data directly without even 
needing to research and build that system on their own.  
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Motivation 
 
China claims that many Yaogan satellites are used for crop measurements (Yin & Yang 2008: 
14). Knowledge regarding the current year’s grain production is useful considering the size of 
China’s population. Indeed, the US entertains a special service for its farmers that predicts crop 
yields in other countries around the world which helps them to decide what to grow in order to 
achieve good prices on the global market. However, the polar orbits of these Yaogan satellites 
are very suitable for reconnaissance operations as well. This relates again to China’s current 
needs of national security and energy security. It is highly useful to have situational awareness 
of certain hotspots that are essential for China’s energy supply. At the same time these 
satellites help China to monitor movements of military troops in relevant areas for China. 
The meteorological satellite fleet that China has established is a dual-use system. On one hand 
every country wants to know about the weather ahead, especially when there is such a huge 
population as in China. Being informed about troubles ahead can help authorities to make life-
saving preparations e.g. the snow storms at the Chinese New Year in 2009. Massive snow fall 
led to a halt of the Chinese railway system. New Years is one of those critical times when 
everybody wants to travel to their family. No matter what hinders Chinese people’s ability to 
visit their family, it will cause a deep sense of disappointment and frustration. In that case the 
PLA was called to help in order to ensure that most people can see their family. Although there 
was no information available whether meteorological satellite data was distributed to 
responsible authorities in advance or not, it definitely is a good example where authorities 
could make better arrangements in case that type of data is available before the actual crisis 
hits.  
Another essential part of the PRC is the PLA. All their actions, be it joint operations with 
Russia or an actual combat situation, requires information about the weather. Knowing the 
current situation is valuable, knowing the weather ahead might sometimes even be more 
important. Having their own weather satellite system allows the PRC to act independently of 
other actors in the game. 
 
Assessment 
 
China has managed to setup a reputable fleet of satellites that are monitoring Earth and space 
environment. At the moment none of the Chinese systems are already fully deployed. 
According to the deputy chief commander of the Chinese manned space project, Zhang Jianqi, 
China will deploy another 15-16 satellites in 2009 (SpaceDaily, 10th March 2009).   
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Returning to my research question on how the space program contributes to the Chinese 
development in the broader sense, remote sensing is a good example. Out of those five needs 
that have been highlighted as key development needs that China has, this program is 
contributing to three of them fully while it can contribute to a forth as well. Those three are 
energy security that China is seeking, improvement of their environment and national security. 
Remote sensing contributes to China’s energy security because it allows monitoring potentially 
dangerous locations on Earth i.e. as of April 2009 the Somali coast. This information is very 
valuable for Chinese oil tankers that traverse in these regions in case of political instability or 
war. Understanding that China’s current import of oil relies strongly on Iran and Saudi Arabia, 
conflicts in this region might prove difficult for China to handle. However, there are other 
choke points along China’s oil procurement route on sea which need to be monitored for 
insuring China’s continuous supply with crude oil.  Remote sensing satellites can offer detailed 
information and, depending on the size of the fleet, the time span between one observation and 
another can be very short.  
Another national development need is China’s military strength to match potential rivals. That 
strength always needs to be seen relatively and at the moment all major militaries in the world 
strongly rely on their global navigation satellite system as well as accurate intelligence 
provided by satellites. These needs have been discussed by China’s military theorists and they 
see space assets as an essential tool to achieve their modernization goals (Cheng 2005: 102). 
China’s upgrade of its remote sensing fleet thus matches definitely their development needs. 
As of the 11th Five-Year Plan environmental issues rank very high on China’s political agenda. 
Pollution throughout the country due to an economical development without considering 
environmental damage has led the way. It has great visibility both for visitors and Chinese, and 
combined with social injustice it is a dangerous mix. While it is understandable, that the 
government wants to improve its environmental situation, this is one area that is very 
challenging to monitor because of its sheer size. Space applications, especially remote sensing, 
can be of immense help because satellite data is able to monitor vast areas and can do so 
repeatedly. This means that certain areas can be monitored over a specific period of time to 
understand whether the pollution level has been reduced or not.  
The fourth item that a remote sensing program supports is innovation. All processes of 
technological development do contain processes of innovation. However, a constraint from the 
US on China, namely ITAR, does not allow US or European companies that sell to the US 
DoD to export their products to China. Some of the key sensors for remote sensing satellites 
like infra-red or satellite aperture radar are on this list. Additionally, these satellites support 
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national security purposes and energy security concerns so China does have a strong interest in 
developing them. Thus the program can be seen as supportive or inductive to technological 
innovation.  
China is deploying meteorological satellites in polar orbit for detailed monitoring and satellites 
in geostationary orbit (GEO) for monitoring larger areas of Earth and its atmosphere. With 
better satellites and better sensors also the amount of data to handle increased which led to a 
proportional growth in the capacity for data transfer and processing. This is reflected by the 
new Chinese meteorological centre in Beijing. China still plans to heavily upgrade its space-
based meteorological satellite system. Before 2020 it aims to launch another 22 satellites 
(SpaceDaily, 11th Dec 2006).   
The growth of China’s remote sensing satellites of type Yaogan is supposedly very helpful in 
various areas. On one hand they offer both imaging and SAR data which enables observation 
both day and night. On the other hand all six Yaogan class satellites have been deployed in the 
last three years. This data shows that there is strong political commitment regarding the need of 
these satellites. Their sensors are still inferior to US imaging and reconnaissance satellites. 
However, one thing that is relevant in comparison with other reconnaissance systems like the 
US keyhole system is the weight of Chinese Yaogan satellites. While keyhole satellites carry 
eight tons of fuel with them, Chinese Yaogan satellites only weigh 2.700 kg (Union of 
Concerned Scientists 2009). This proves that China’s capacity to monitor any given place at 
any given time is still far inferior to the US because the amount of fuel determines how often a 
satellite can change its position in space. A bigger tank allows more maneuvers, until the 
depletion of its fuel. Whenever a specific event needs to be monitored, it normally requires a 
maneuver to change a satellite’s orbit. Due to the small amount of fuel that the Chinese Yaogan 
satellites have, there are not many maneuvers they can execute. 
 
6.3.3 Space transport systems 
 
Space transport systems have the goal of delivering payload into space. For most satellites this 
means any orbit around Earth, for exploratory missions this might mean a Moon-bound 
trajectory. Rockets and spaceports are essential for this task. Depending on the rockets and 
spaceports available, certain missions can be flown while others can not. China has developed 
a diverse family of launch vehicles that are used to launch satellites both for China and other 
nations.  
Two things are important for rockets: weight of payload and its orbit. The first one explains 
how much weight that rocket can launch into space. The second parameter describes into 
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which orbit this weight can be delivered. In general it can be said that a higher orbit means that 
less weight can be delivered. With analogy to cargo and trucks some modern satellites (for 
example those that students work on in order to learn how to build them) only weigh a few 
kilos while telecom satellites that handle satellite TV or serve as internet backbone can be as 
heavy as five tons. For more information regarding satellite orbits please refer to section 6.1. 
 
Scope 
 
This section discusses the different launch vehicles China has designed and that are still in use. 
I do not deal with their predecessors. Basic data is provided about the current work-horse 
rockets of the Chinese space program. In addition to this data the most important data 
regarding the Chinese launch sites such as their location and the inclination they can launch 
into, is listed underneath. This section deals with the launch vehicles capacity regarding space 
technology and it does not discuss their connection with ballistic missiles.  
This section does not discuss any cases of unwanted technology transfer as mentioned in the 
Cox report. Furthermore, there is no discussion on how much of Chinese technology is based 
on Russian rockets due to early technical support of Russian technicians for the Chinese rocket 
program. 
 
Reference  
 
Most countries start off with developing ballistic missiles that have the capacity to deliver a 
warhead from its launch site to its target. The V-2 rocket gave birth to modern rocketry and 
was developed in Peenemünde in Germany during World War II. It was feared and hated 
among its enemies. After the war both the Russians and the Americans started to copy its 
design. Both countries had managed to get some top scientists from the Nazi regime to work 
for them. In the US the main scientist was Wernher von Braun who led the development of the 
Saturn V, the vehicle that would eventually send humans to the Moon. 
During the Cold War both countries developed ICBMs. They had the capacity to take a 
warhead from its launch site to other continents, in that case from Russia to the US and vice 
versa. That time also saw the development of the world’s strongest rockets e.g. the Saturn V 
which was used for the US Moon program named Apollo. China’s rocket development went 
through similar stages. 
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Basic Data 
  
All the systems listed in the table underneath are those that are still in use. The design of the 
Chang Zheng series is based on the Chinese ballistic missile Dong Feng-5 (东风-5). For further 
details on the Chinese family of rockets please consult the site of Mark Wade (Wade 1997) and 
SinoDefence (SinoDefence, 17th August 2007).  Detailed information was also taken from the 
Long March 2C User’s Manual (Federation of American Scientists 1999) and Changzheng 
Xilie Yunzai Huojian Jieshao: Changzheng San Hao Xielie-Wu (Chen 1998).  
  
 
 Source: Chen Lan homepage 
 
  
 CZ-2C CZ-2D CZ-2E CZ-2F 
Chinese 长征二号丙 长征二号丁 长征二号捆绑式 长征二号己 
Fuel N2O4/UDMH N2O4/UDMH N2O4/UDMH N2O4/UDMH 
Isp [sec] x1 - xn 
  
291/295 289/295 291/ 289/ 298 291/ 289/ 298 
Stages [-] 2 2 3 3 
Strap-On Boosters 0 0 4 4 
Deliverable 
payload [kg] 
3.366 kg 3.500 kg LEO 14.100 kg 
GTO   3.500 kg 
LEO 8.400 kg 
GTO 3.500 kg 
Height [km] h=200km  
i=63° 
h=200km 
i=28° 
h=200km  
i=48° 
h=185 km 
i=57° 
Liftoff Thrust 2,960.000 kN 2,926.200 kN 5,920.000 kN 5,920.000 kN 
Weight (empty) 14.000 kg 13.500 kg 23.000 kg 18.200 kg 
Weight (fuelled) 192.000 kg 232.250 kg 368.000 kg 329.000 kg 
Launch price $ 25 Mio  
($ 1999 rate) 
$ 15 Mio  
($ 1999 rate) 
$ 50 Mio ($ ’99) 
($ 1999 rate) 
N/A 
Launch site Jiuquan, 
Xichang 
Jiuquan Jiuquan Jiuquan 
Success rate 100% N/A 71,4% 100% 
Launches 22 (04-2007) 8 (05-2007) 7 (05-2007) 6 (10-2005) 
Table 3: Performance characteristics of Changzheng-2 family 
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 CZ-3A CZ-3B CZ-3C 
Chinese 长征三号甲 长征三号乙 长征三号丙 
Fuel N2O4/UDMH  & 
Lox/ LH2 (3rd stage) 
N2O4/UDMH 
Lox/ LH2 (4th stage) 
N2O4/UDMH 
Lox/ LH2 (4th stage) 
Isp [sec] x1 - xn 
  
289/ 297/ 440 291/289/298/ 440 291/289/298/ 440 
Stages [-] 3 4 4 
Strap-On Boosters 0 4 2 
Deliverable 
payload [kg] 
GTO 2,700 kg  
LEO 7,200 kg 
GTO 5,100 kg 
LEO 11,200 kg 
GEO 3,800 kg 
LEO 8,900 kg 
Height [km] GEO19 /  
200km, i=28,5° 
GEO /  
200km, i=28,5° 
GEO / 
200km, i=28,5° 
Liftoff Thrust 2,960.000 kN 4,440.000 kN 4,440.000 kN 
Weight (empty) 15.800 kg 20.000 kg 20.000 kg 
Weight (fuelled) 233.600 kg 296.000 kg 296.000 kg 
Launch price $ 55 Mio  
($ 1999 rate) 
$ 70 Mio  
($ 1999 rate) 
$ 75 Mio 
($ 1999 rate) 
Launch site Xichang Xichang Xichang 
Success rate n/a 89 % n/a 
Launches 15 (10-2007) 9 (07-2007) n/a 
       Table 4: Performance characteristics of Changzheng-3 family 
 
 CZ-4A CZ-4B CZ-4C 
Chinese 长征四号甲 长征四号乙 长征四号丙 
Fuel N2O4/UDMH N2O4/UDMH N2O4/UDMH 
Isp [sec] x1 - xn 
 
289/295/303 289/295/303 289/295/303 
Stages [-] 3 3 3 
Strap-On 
Boosters 
0 0 0 
Deliverable 
payload [kg] 
LEO 4,680 kg 
SSO 1,600 kg20 
GTO 1,100 kg 
LEO 2,800 kg 
SSO 2,800 kg 
 
LEO 2,800 kg 
SSO 2,800 kg 
 
Height [km] Polar & sun-
synchronous 
orbit 
Polar & sun-
synchronous 
orbit 
Polar & sun-
synchronous 
orbit 
Thrust 2,960.000 kN 2,960.000 kN 2,960.000 kN 
Weight (empty) 14.500 kg 14.500 kg 14.500 kg 
Weight 
(fuelled) 
247.400 kg 249.500 kg 250.000 kg 
Launch price $ 30 Mio. 
($ 1994 rate) 
$ 35 Mio. 
($ 1999) 
$ 35 Mio. 
($ 1999) 
Launch site Taiyuan Taiyuan Taiyuan 
Success rate 100% 100% n/a 
Launches 2 (09-1990) 6 n/a 
Table 5: Performance characteristics of Changzheng-4 family 
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 GEO is defined at a height of 35,790 km (NASA 2006) 
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Spaceports 
 
Rockets require extensive ground facilities for their launch. These facilities are very limited as 
they are both expensive to build and to maintain. The most important parameters are: 
geographical location, as this determines into which inclination can be launched in a fuel-
efficient way; and the facilities available, which determine the type of rockets supported. 
 
 
Launch Site Jiuquan Taiyuan Xichang 
Chinese name 酒泉 太原 西昌 
Latitude 41.11803° 39.14321° 28.246744° 
Longitude 100.46330° 111.96741° 102.026736° 
Inclination range 40° - 56° 97° - 99° 28° - 36° 
Supported rockets CZ-2C, CZ-2D, 
CZ-2F 
CZ-1, CZ-2C, 
CZ-4B, CZ-4C 
CZ-2E, CZ-3A, 
CZ-3B, CZ-3C, CZ-4B, 
CZ-4C 
Launch pads 2 1 2 
Launches so far 73 46 34 
Dedication manned spacecraft polar orbits GEO launches 
Table 6: Chinese spaceports21 
 
  
According to media reports, China will begin building a new spaceport soon on its southern 
island of Hainan. That spaceport, being closer to the equator, will save a lot of fuel and will 
reduce the price of future missions. Additionally, the launch site will allow launching rockets 
towards the ocean, resulting in higher safety compared to trajectories above inhabited areas. At 
the moment Jiuquan is the dedicated spaceport for China’s manned space program. The 
upcoming missions that will test China’s docking and rendezvous maneuver will be launched 
from there. Xichang serves as the spaceport for GEO missions and also tries to acquire more 
launch deals with foreign companies. This spaceport has repeatedly launched foreign satellites 
and does not have security restrictions as tight Jiuquan or Taiyuan spaceports. Taiyuan serves 
its purpose for missions with high inclination whose nature is weather observation, imaging, 
reconnaissance, etc. Additionally, Taiyuan is one of the key sites for China’s ICMBs.   
 
Motivation   
 
Space transport systems are crucial to fulfill many needs of the Chinese space program. 
Chinese development plans ask for manned space exploration and rockets can be considered as 
basic infrastructure in making this happen. When China wants to realize its lunar exploration 
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 See Wade 1997 
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plans it needs a transport vehicle to send their Chang’e satellite into orbit and on to the Moon. 
The same applies to the development of a Chinese satellite navigation system or for the 
development of a Chinese earth observation system. Thus it can be said that space 
transportation systems are the backbone of any space program. It is in this way that the current 
improvement of existing rockets and the development of the new Changzheng-5, which will be 
used both for the deployment of the Chinese space station and future lunar missions, are 
aligned with the Chinese development plans. 
The Chinese space program started with Qian Xue Sen (钱学森) who was deported from the 
United States and started to build up the Chinese rocket program. Back then the whole idea 
was to create this program for national prestige and military use. Delivering Dong Fang Hong 
(东方红), the first Chinese satellite, into orbit was essential to show the world that China was 
also capable of achieving what the West had already achieved. Deploying the first missile, 
Dong Feng-1 (东风), was important for China’s deterrence strategy. 
An improvement in guidance for space bound rockets also means a potential improvement for 
guidance in ICBMs. This was one of the major issues with the Clinton administration and its 
alleged, and unwanted, transfer of strategic technology to China. All these things have been 
pointed out by the Cox report. This duality of a technology for peaceful use in space-related 
missions and as a deadly tool for military purposes has been highlighted by recent tests in 
North Korea. According to Brian Weeden from the Secure World Foundation, there is no way 
to distinguish an intercontinental missile launch from a satellite launch until very late after its 
start (Weeden, 9th March 2009).  
Although often stated that China is pursuing market privatization in its space sector it is still 
does not sign many big, international deals. With competitors like the Russians who offer very 
reliable and low cost launches from Baikonur as well as the mobile launch platform SEA 
Launch, China still has its difficulties in getting more contracts. Another obstacle that is hard to 
circumnavigate is ITAR which forbids the export of any sensitive technology products from 
US to China; it also forbids the launch of any US built satellites in China. 
One thing that should not be overlooked is that the development of a heavy-lift launch vehicle 
is also on the development agenda of the PRC. According to the 11th Five-Year Plan for Space 
Development China plans to develop a heavy-lift vehicle named Changzheng-5 that can deliver 
satellites to low-earth orbit with a mass of ten to fifteen tons and into GEO transfer orbit with a 
mass of six to fourteen tons (Hangtian Fazhan Shiyiwu Guihua 2007: 8).  
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Assessment 
 
China’s space program has produced a well-balanced family of launch vehicles. The different 
launch vehicles can deliver all kinds of satellites into orbit. This means that they can send 
satellites in a LEO orbit for reconnaissance applications; they can send satellites into polar 
orbits; they have launch vehicles that allow them to deliver satellites of about five tons into 
GEO orbit. The only capacity that China has not developed yet, but is currently developing, is 
a heavy launch vehicle that would allow them to send a bigger spaceship on a trajectory bound 
for the Moon. 
In terms of their capacity to deliver satellites into a precise orbit China has a good track record. 
The Changzheng-2 series has had over more than 100 successful launches and 77 of them in a 
row. Its recent development and deployment of satellites for Venezuela and Nigeria also 
support this line of thought (Hu 2008). Although the telecom satellite for Nigeria suffered a 
malfunction after a few months into its service, it was eventually delivered into its intended 
orbit. While its track record seems to be reasonably good, it is difficult for China to deal with 
ITAR imposed restrictions. ITAR essentially forbids Western companies to launch their 
satellites on Chinese rockets.  
Another indicator for China’s impressive success record is its recent deal in February 2009 
with Eutelsat (a European telecommunication satellite operator) to launch one of its five ton 
satellites into orbit (McCracken, 25th Feb 2009). At the moment China is working on its 
Changzheng-5 heavy lift vehicle that will allow China to send some 25 tons into orbit 
(SpaceDaily, 4th March 2009).   
 
6.3.4 Beidou 
 
The Chinese Beidou satellite navigation system has a different architecture than the US GPS 
system. While the US GPS works with 24 satellites and three spare satellites that are all in 
medium earth orbit (MEO), the Chinese Beidou satellite system works on a two tier 
implementation phase. The first phase, also known as Beidou-I, utilizes four GEO satellites, 
two of them being spare satellites, covering the longitude from 58.75° E to 140° E in orbit (so 
an even higher range on Earth) and an initial system control center (SinoDefence, 16th April 
2009). The second phase of the system, Beidou-II, will then utilize the well known setup of 24 
operational satellites and three in-orbit spare satellites.   
This system’s setup requires end users to transmit their signals back to the control center. The 
system’s control center feeds two dimensional data into a mapping database and then calculates 
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relatively accurate three dimensional coordinates (Kang 2007: 16). Although this system is less 
convenient and more expensive for end users, however it already works with only two GEO 
satellites in orbit and a control center. All other systems had to deploy a dozen satellites before 
they could provide useful coordinates (Wade 2008). 
The rollout of Beidou-II began with the launch of the first satellite into orbit in 2008. 
Alongside, the frequencies reserved at the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) will 
be utilized and the system waits only for the deployment of the following satellites which will 
happen in the next years. 
 
Scope 
 
This section outlines the state of the Chinese satellite navigation system Beidou, also known as 
Compass. After offering some basic data regarding satellite deployment it discusses the 
motivation of the Chinese government to create another global positioning system when the US 
GPS and the Russian Glonass system are already operating, while the European Galileo system 
is attempting to come into existence.  
It does not offer an exhaustive technical insight into the system but rather a short overview. 
Furthermore, this section does not attempt to explain the Chinese role in the European 
undertaking of Galileo.  
 
Reference data 
 
At the moment there are only two global positioning systems in the world. One of them is the 
Russian Glonass system, which currently does not offer full coverage. The other system is the 
American GPS system that is managed by the Space Command of the US Army. This system 
consists of 24 satellites and three in orbit spare satellites that are split into six orbital planes 
with four satellites for each plane. It took the US 22 years (1973-1995) to complete their 
system (Tan & Dou 2008: 11). One of the key issues the US program encountered was early 
problems with the reliability of the atomic clock, which is one of the key components for high 
location accuracy. On one hand it is difficult to manufacture these clocks and on the other hand 
the US faced many setbacks in space due to a harsh environment i.e. the malfunction of the 
atomic clock.  
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The Basics 
 
Satellite  Position 
Beidou-1A GEO 140,0° East 
Beidou-1B GEO   80,0° East 
Beidou-1C GEO 110,5° East 
Beidou-1D GEO   86,0° East 
Beidou-2A MEO  21.500km22 
Table 7: Chinese Beidou satellites 
 
 
Table 7 shows that China has already deployed five satellites. The first satellite is not in use as 
it was an experimental satellite that was launched in 2000 for test purposes. Beidou-1B through 
1D and 2A are in use. While Beidou-I satellites are designed as a regional navigation system, 
Beidou-2 satellites are part of a full-fledged global navigation satellite system. 
Beidou-I operates differently than the well-known GPS system. Instead of calculating the 
precise position in the GPS receiver, Beidou-I requires the end unit to transmit a position 
request to one of the satellites in reach. That satellite relays this request to the control centre. 
At the control centre the estimated position, acquired through the method of triangulation, is 
fed into a mapping database system. Inaccuracy exists because only two satellites offer 
triangulation data when ideally four would be needed. By correlating the estimate with 
mapping data the accuracy of the position data increases. Then this information is transmitted 
to the user (Kang 2007: 16).   
A notable fact of Beidou-I is its capability to send and receive messages between its end units–
although it only allows for 120 Chinese characters in a message. One of the drawbacks of the 
system is that the end user needs to resend data to one of the satellites to get an accurate 
position. Geoffrey Forden from Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) pointed out in 
one of his articles that this implies big limitations on the military use of this system, as combat 
units give away their position by resending data (Forden 2004: 220).  
Published data shows that the feature of unit-to-unit communication has been used extensively 
so far. An article from a news site reporting on issues of national defense states that the 
systems capability to send a message was used half as often as the determination of a unit’s 
position, 120 Mio vs. 250 Mio (Guofang, 5th Jan 2009). Furthermore the industry’s 
management magazine Hangtian Gongye Guanli (航天工业管理) states that there are more 
than 40.000 users as of January 2009 (Fang & Li 2007: 26). 
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 While GEO satellites stay on the same spot relative to any given position on Earth, any satellite’s location can 
be calculated via its orbital parameters which are height (or perigee and apogee), inclination and orbital period. 
   
   
  62 
 
Accuracy GPS – public Beidou – public 
position23 2.5m-7m 10m 
speed 0.04m/sec – 0.22m/sec 0.2m/sec 
altitude 20km N/A 
Table 8: Beidou vs. GPS accuracy 
 
 
Table 8 shows Beidou’s accuracy is less than that of GPS. Although Beidou-II is deployed 
comparatively quickly it will still take some time to achieve its full capacity and thus its full 
accuracy. At the moment the most precise satellite navigation system remains GPS.  
Above noted limits and values do not necessarily represent the GPS inherent limits but rather 
reflect measurement limitations imposed on consumer GPS devices by US regulation. The 
system as such can have a much higher accuracy, but it is only available for military units. 
 
Motivation 
 
The evaluation of the Chinese satellite navigation system Beidou, also known as Compass, has 
various important aspects. One hand there is China’s participation in the satellite navigation 
project of the European Union, Galileo. On the other hand side there is China’s continuous 
investment in the modernization of its military. The recent US-led wars proved that satellite 
navigation and communication have become essential tools in modern warfare. In this way the 
development and deployment of this system does help China to protect its national security 
wherever it is at risk. The development of a self-made system while at the same time having a 
contract signed with the European Union also shows certain discrepancies with the 
development of Galileo. Furthermore the current development of the Beidou-II system shall 
allow China to have a global satellite navigation system at their command. That might be 
useful when it comes to oil transport from its country of origin to China as well as other areas 
that require global awareness.  
The MLP suggests the development of a smart traffic management system for Chinese cities. 
Developments like these tend to be based on satellite navigation systems. Currently there are 
also policy discussions regarding which system Chinese will have to use in the future. At the 
same time the White Papers on Space talk about the need to privatize space operations and 
create market opportunities for space-related projects. This might be seen as one of them. 
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 Data on accuracy is based on Hangtian Gongye Guanli (2009: 41) 
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Currently there are three countries that maintain a satellite navigation system. These three 
countries are Russia, the US and China with its regional satellite navigation system: Beidou-I. 
Europe is still trying to create political commitment for its Galileo satellite navigation system. 
Both the US and Russia have extensive interests in various parts of the world. Even more, 
especially the US demonstrated with its recent wars how warfare can change if a military has 
access to both satellite communication and a satellite navigation system. The extensive use of 
precision guided ammunition has changed wars. Through these weapons and systems there is 
less need for infantry while more enemy units are killed with precision guided ammunition. 
China has observed these developments and military theorists have suggested that China needs 
to modernize the PLA in regard to communication and in regard to the usage of space-based 
assets (Fang & Li 2007: 26). In this context the development of a Chinese-made satellite 
navigation system seems to serve national security needs rather than civilian independence.  
Another factor that links to China’s current needs is energy security. Those vessels that 
currently transport crude oil to China use data from a satellite navigation system to calculate 
their position. In case of a conflict it is highly unlikely that China can rely on the US-military 
controlled GPS. The creation of its own system thus ensures not only that China’s military has 
access to a satellite navigation system but also its merchant vessels that transport all sorts of 
goods but above all energy-related products like crude oil have access to such a system.  
 
Assessment 
 
At the moment the Chinese Beidou-I system is in place and provides relatively accurate 
regional coverage. The system has demonstrated China’s capability to create a system based on 
needs rather than technical talent. For the current Chinese needs it was more efficient to 
develop a regional positioning system which offers positioning data quickly as opposed to a 
full fledged GNSS.  
The next step has already started with the deployment of the first Beidou-II satellite. Only time 
will show how quickly China is capable of producing and deploying the needed satellites to get 
Beidou-II operational. Various sources like Zhongguo Hangtian, Hangtian Gongye Guanli, and 
interviews state that China will deliver twelve Beidou-II satellites into orbit in 2009. However, 
compiling this part of the thesis, the end of March 2009 already approached and only one 
Beidou-II satellite has been delivered to its orbit so far. Space environment can be very harsh 
and one needs to see whether China has already fully mastered the installation of atomic 
clocks–one of the core technologies needed for a global positioning system. Apart from that, 
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there are many components that can fail on a satellite, as the recent malfunction of Chinese-
built Nigerian telecom satellite has shown.  
Beidou-I seems to have proven reliable and useful. The recent earthquake in Sichuan saw the 
deployment of military troops that utilized Beidou-I units as all other ways of communication 
were interrupted (Fan et al 2008: 11). The system not only offers positioning data like other 
satellite navigation systems but additionally allows units to send 120 character messages to 
each other. This feature seems to have been used extensively as Fang stated that Beidou-I was 
used half as often to send messages as to calculate a unit’s current position (Fang & Li 2007: 
26).  
Both Beidou-I and Beidou-II also seem to confirm a general trend of modernizing the PLA. 
While there are more submarine bases built, new weapon systems acquired and more focus put 
on the development of staff, Beidou also contributes to a strengthened military. The 
combination of data from Beidou with radar data, and intelligence from other space assets (e.g. 
Yaogan satellites) is closer to what military theorists were calling for. This is in accordance 
with China’s new military doctrine to update its battlefield operations to the 21st century 
(Wortzel 2007: 8). 
One thing that seems critical is the fact that Beidou-II’s frequencies partially overlay Galileo’s 
frequency range for Public Regulated Services which include the military, ambulance, 
firefighters, etc. At the same time China also participated in the development of Galileo and 
paid € 200 Mio for participation and technology collaboration in the joint Galileo undertaking 
(Ma & Kong 2008: 75). The Beidou-II system is also accompanied by a strong effort of 
commercialization of space exploration in China (Liu 2007). 
 
6.3.5 Telecommunication system 
 
One of the components of a space program with immediate applications on Earth is the 
telecommunication sector. Telecommunication satellites can transmit TV signals or serve as 
internet backbone as data is sent via a satellite. Its relevance for the manned space program lies 
in data relay and in the ground infrastructure that receives data either directly or from that data 
relay satellite. Through the deployment of this satellite China can increase its communication 
slots with Shenzhou missions many times.  
Furthermore China used its telecommunication capacity already many years back in order to 
transmit health education programs to its rural areas in the west. The telecommunication sector 
is also relevant for China’s attempt to commercialize its space industry. It is one of the few 
space sectors that are profitable for private space companies in the West e.g. Intelsat, Loreal, 
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SES. The reason for this is the ever increasing demand for communication channels on Earth 
and the well understood makings of a communication satellite. 
 
Scope 
 
This section deals with Chinese telecommunication satellites and their capabilities. 
Furthermore it offers some data on China’s sole data relay satellite.  
It does not deal with foreign communication satellites in GEO serving demands from the East 
Asian hemisphere. I shortly discuss satellite applications but I do not intend to offer an 
exhaustive overview on the potential applications of satellite telecommunication. Furthermore, 
the Chinese global navigation satellite system Beidou is dealt with in a separate part due to its 
importance and special nature. 
 
The basics 
 
Satellite 
designation 
Purpose Contractor Launch 
date 
Operating 
Organization 
Apstar-1 Communication HSCG 21.07.1994 ASH 
Chinastar-1, 
Zhongwei-1,  
中卫-1 
GEO com Thales Alenia Space 
30.05.1998 
 
ChinaSat 
 
Chinasat-20,  
Zhongxing-20,  
中星-20 
GEO com CAST 14.11.2003 PLA 
Chinasat-22A,  
Zhongxing-22A, 
中星-22A 
GEO com CAST 12.09.2006 ChinaSat 
Chinasat-6B,  
Zhongxing-6B,  
中星-6 
GEO com Lockheed Martin 06.07.2007 
ChinaSat 
 
Tian Lian 1A,  
天链一号 
Data relay CAST 25.04.2008 CAST 
Chinasat-9,  
Zhongxing-9,  
中星-9 
GEO com CAST 09.06.2008 ChinaSat 
VeneSat-1 
(Simon Bolivar) Communication 
Great Wall 
Industry Corp24 29.10.2008 
MoST 
Venezuela 
 Table 9: Selection of Chinese communication satellites 
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 The Great Wall Industry Corporation (GWIC) is a state owned entity whose task it is to import space-related 
technology and export Chinese space-related products. A satellite manufactured by them means that most likely 
either CAST or SAST (Shanghai Academy of Satellite Technology) has manufactured this satellite, and GWIC 
acted as broker between producer and client.  
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Legend:  
 CAST Chinese Academy of Space Technology 
 PLA People’s Liberation Army 
 ChinaSat  China Satellite Communication Corp. 
 MoST  Ministry of Science and Technology 
 HSCG Hughes Space and Communications Group 
 ASH APT Satellite Holdings Ltd. – China 
 
Table 9 only shows recent satellites to demonstrate what kind of satellites China has build and 
which entity operates them. Data is taken from UCS satellite database which also offers orbital 
parameters and further details (Union of Concerned Scientists 2009). 
One important observation is that China is building more and more satellites on its own and 
thus it also builds up more experience. Chinsat-20, which is operated by the military, is a good 
example. There are two reasons for this. On one hand the US ITAR agreement forbids Western 
satellite manufacturers to sell any sensitive components to China or launch any of their 
satellites with Chinese rocket.25 Considering that a remote sensing or communication satellite 
is full of components listed as sensitive under ITAR, this means that hardly any western 
companies dare to make deals with Chinese as this would exclude them from lucrative deals 
with the US government. Thus the assumption is that China had to increase its own knowledge 
in this area as Western companies simply would not sell their products to China anymore.  
On the other hand, China saw a good opportunity in using its space know-how in exchange for 
something else. The oil deals with Venezuela fall in this category. At the same time China also 
explored the opportunity to gain other advantages for its national security in return for space 
assets, which relates to China’s satellite deal with Pakistan. So these two options also present 
good reasons to increase the capacity as the stakes to be won are high.  
 
Motivation 
 
Returning to my research question on the relation of China’s space program and their capacity, 
this sector plays a vital role. The ability to communicate with spacecraft is similarly important 
to the development of rockets for a space program: it does not work without them. While 
rockets deploy spacecraft in orbit, it is the communication infrastructure that allows the 
command centre to stay in touch with them, react to new events and fix problems after they 
have occurred. In this function the development of all these assets contributes to those space-
related projects that China has mentioned in their plans.  
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 More details are offered by the Cox report (Cox 1999). In general the treaty got established because of 
suspicion that China used western satellites’ components to improve their own rockets’ control and guidance 
system. 
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Lately China also started to produce and deploy satellites for other countries like Venezuela, 
Nigeria and Pakistan. These procurements were often connected with counter-businesses in the 
realm of energy or national security. Thus communication satellites are an example 
demonstrating how specific products of a space program can be used as leverage point in 
negotiations with other countries. 
The Chinese White Paper for Space 2006 (Guowuyuan 2006) clearly lists the expansion of the 
communication satellite capacity as one of its key goals for the upcoming five years (2006-
2010). The development of high capacity GEO communication satellites, satellite TV, 
development of broadband media capability, emergency communication services and satellite 
broadcast technology for public use are all put down as key development points of the space 
based telecommunication sector. Many of these goals relate to the overarching goal of 
commercializing China’s telecommunication sector (Guowuyuan 2006: 3). 
Increased need for global communication is the underlying driver for this part of the program. 
On one hand civil communication increases so in order to offer digital TV China needs to have 
space based telecommunication assets. Another essential issue is to increase communication 
time with their manned spacecraft, Shenzhou. Putting a data relay satellite into orbit achieves 
exactly that, increased communication time with their spacecraft (Chen & Chen 2009: 16). 
This increases a mission’s security because China can react quicker in case something happens. 
That also means that less of China’s ships for telemetry, tracking and communication need to 
be deployed. Furthermore, that data relay satellite can increase the amount of data that can be 
transferred to the control centre from other science and Earth observation missions because 
these satellites do not need to store that much information on-board but they simply send it to 
that data relay satellite which forwards it to a control centre.  
Another immense program driver is that telecommunication is one of the few space related 
areas that can be managed by private entities and generate profit. Those telecom satellites 
China has delivered to international customers are a shining example.26 On one hand it is 
beneficial for China to sell their technical knowledge to other countries to increase their return 
on investment. However, space assets are considered high-tech. China’s willingness to share 
this knowledge with others or at least to let them operate a satellite is a smart application of 
soft power that shows other countries that China is willing to cooperate with them.  
Last but not least communication is not only needed for civilians but also for the military. 
China is very much aware that the last wars that the US has fought and their successes were 
heavily related to their communication capability and their reconnaissance system (Wang & 
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 NigerSat was deployed but crashed later on though, a deal was signed with Venezuela and another deal was 
signed with Pakistan. 
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Chen 2004: 2). As Space Daily reported in April 2009 the US company Artel, which is 
responsible for offering satellite access to the Department of Defense, signed another deal with 
Intelsat, a major satellite operator, to reposition on of its satellites to a geostationary location 
accessible from both Iraq and Afghanistan (Lewis, 24th March 2009). That request is based on 
the US military’s need of further bandwidth for supporting their unmanned aerial vehicle 
(UAV) operations on site. The article stated that this was the third request on short notice for 
bandwidth that was met due to Intelsat’s high flexibility. This shows that at least in the West, 
commercial satellite operators fill the gap when military resources are scarce. Given the high 
costs of satellite development and maintenance it is likely that China is also interested in 
starting to develop certain companies that are not working for the military only but can help 
out, in case help is needed.  
 
Assessment 
 
It seems that China is increasingly using its space technology to acquire energy-related or 
national security related deals with other countries. One part that many countries are seeking to 
acquire is for telecommunication. Either there is a perceived need to implement digital 
television or there are other reasons to improve existing communication networks via a satellite. 
China has signed deals with Venezuela, Nigeria and Pakistan. While the first two countries are 
most likely to supply China with oil, Pakistan is apparently supporting China in the 
construction of a submarine base on its territory. So apart from fulfilling China’s own needs in 
regard to communication infrastructure or more specific services, China has discovered the 
value of space technology for negotiations regarding assets that China wants to acquire.  
In terms of China’s capacity to ensure communication with spacecraft further away from Earth 
it has already proven that it is capable of handling communication with spacecraft in an orbit 
around the Moon. China’s plans for further missions to the Moon, which are stated in the 
current Five-Year Plan, make it safe to assume that these capacities are currently available and 
shall at least be maintained or even improved for future missions. Furthermore, China is 
working on a collaborative mission with Russia called Phobos-Grunt to the Mars Moon Phobos. 
That requires an even better telecommunication network in order to send and receive telemetry 
and command signals for that probe. 
Comparing China’s space based assets with those of both the US and Russia it is very obvious 
that China still lacks far behind. While the US Navy and the US Air Force operate a fleet of 
dedicated communication satellites positioned around the world in convenient GEO orbits, the 
PLA only owns a few. This implies that the PLAs capacity to ensure secured communication is 
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comparatively low when it comes to a global theatre of actions. However, in accord with 
military theorists within the PLA claiming that its modernization needs to happen as soon as 
possible and in alignment with China’s build up of its satellite navigation system Beidou, it 
seems reasonable to assume that China will accelerate the deployment of further dedicated 
military satellites. That way it decreases the gap between the PLA and what the US military 
has demonstrated that it is capable of doing and at the same time modernizing its military 
forces. 
 
6.3.6 Chang’e  
 
The Moon has always been an important companion in our history. Many a culture has their 
own stories and tales about the Moon and its inhabitants. In Austrian countryside culture the 
Moon calendar is still used by some people for activities as mundane as hair cutting or sawing. 
It is also not the first time in history that the human race has it deemed worthy to undertake the 
endeavor of exploring the Moon. Back in the times of the Cold War the famous speech of John 
F. Kennedy was the beginning of the Apollo missions. They culminated with the landing of 
Neil Armstrong, Buzz Aldrin and Michael Collins on the Moon in 1969. 
The Chinese Moon missions have come up only recently and there have been many other space 
agencies that have already sent satellites to the Moon e.g. ESA with SMART-I, JAXA with 
Selene, etc. However, Moon missions do require special technology. The Chinese Moon 
program is divided into three steps: first step is to orbit and survey the Moon, the second step is 
to land on it and the third step is to bring back soil samples to the Earth (Ping 2007: 55).   
 
Scope 
 
This section deals with the Chinese Moon program and its achievements. It does not deal in 
depth with technical issues but only touches some of them. There is no discussion regarding 
how technology transfer contributed to China developing their Chang’e mission.  
 
References 
 
When the US and the former Soviet Union began their race to the Moon there was no proof 
that it is even possible to send human beings there. Nobody knew how to send satellites there 
either. Many issues occurred during their space programs including rocket launch failures, 
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orbit insertion failures and missing the Moon. It needs to be understood that it was a first in 
human history and also that those tools available e.g. fast computers were very limited. 
According to Sven Grahn some of the relevant accidents that occurred were explosions 
(Russian E-1, US Pioneer-0 and P-31), then there were some rocket failures i.e. problems with 
strap-on boosters, engine ignition failures and engine shutdowns. Another common failure type 
was that satellites failed to capture the Moon’s orbit e.g. Russian Luna-1. It was those 
problems that the early Soviet Union and US Moon programs had to fight with. 
 
Technology Use 
Carrier rocket technology To launch a satellite towards the Moon 
“Orbital precision” To get that satellite into lunar orbit 
TT&C (telemetry, 
tracking & 
communication) 
To ensure communication 
Precise launch readiness Lunar missions only have a relatively 
short time window so you can not start 
that satellite whenever you want.  
Radiation shielding To withstand space environment outside 
Earth’s magnetic field 
Materials that withstand 
big changes in 
temperature 
Due to temperature changes of exposure 
to sun light or Moon shadow 
Table 10: Technologies required for Moon missions 
 
Table 10 contains technologies that are required for launching a Moon mission. Worth 
mentioning among them are the fact that the satellite needs to fly towards the Moon in a 
narrowly defined way which was one of the many failures that occurred in early US and Soviet 
Union missions. Furthermore, it is tricky to build a satellite that can withstand the harsh 
environmental conditions that occur on a normal Moon mission e.g. Moon shadow. While 
communication with LEO satellites is straight forward and a lot of experience has been gained, 
it needs to be noted that the potential error rate rises significantly for a Moon mission. 
Additionally to that the signal of the satellite down to Earth gets very weak due to the large 
distance which requires special protocols that can ensure high data accuracy with weak signals. 
Although the first US and Soviet missions to the Moon were failures, it should be added that 
Europe successfully launched SMART-1 in August 2003. This mission did not have any of the 
above mentioned problems like missing the Moon or propulsion issues (ESA 2007). Apart 
from ESA there was the Indian Space Agency (ISRO) that had successfully launched 
Chandrayaan-1 and the Japanese Selene mission. While early missions did not have a very high 
success rate, meanwhile many other space agencies have executed successful missions.  
   
   
  71 
The general nature of unmanned Moon exploration is the same for all countries. First of all an 
agency would aim for a lunar orbiter with the task of scouting the surface, getting new 
scientific data and checking all the basic technology elements required for this mission. The 
second step is to send missions with the purpose of landing on the lunar surface. These 
missions have the goal to develop and test the landing technology that is required for the Holy 
Grail of Lunar exploration: a sample return mission. Sample return means to send a robot to the 
Moon, land it there, get it to find some soil samples that are promising for scientists and bring 
them back to Earth so that they can be examined.  
 
The basics 
 
In 2007 China launched its Chang’e mission to the Moon. The missions’ goal was to map the 
Moon’s surface and to finish the mission with a hard impact on the Moon. The idea of the final 
impact is to gather as much data as possible about the Moon’s surface. This data will be very 
useful for follow-up missions. The next mission is a precursor mission with the goal of testing 
Moon landing technology (Zi 2007: 4; Sun 2003: 11). 
  
Project start date April 2002 
Launch time 6:05pm, 24th Oct 2007 
Launch site Xichang 
Launch vehicle Changzheng-3A 
Arrival final orbit 7th Nov 2007  
Location ground station Beijing 
Lunar orbit – height 200 km 
Lunar orbit – period 127 min 
Satellite instruments CCD camera, Laser altimeter, Gamma & X-Ray 
spectrometer, Microwave meter, High energy 
particle detector, 2 low energy particle detectors 
Satellite weight 2.350 kg 
Satellite platform Dong Fang Hong 3 (东方红三号卫星平台) 
Final impact 9th Jan 2009 
Mission time 442 days 
Table 11: Key facts on  Chang'e-I27 
 
 
The Chinese Chang’e mission has been a big success. The planned mission lifetime of one year 
was surpassed by nearly a third. The launch and orbital insertion happened without any glitch. 
The data collected from the satellite was used for a 3D model of the lunar surface. Not only did 
the Chinese mission create a map of the lunar surface but it also analyzed all elements all over 
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 See Xiao 2007  
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the Moon. One reason for that, as Chinese researchers claim, is their hope to mine Helium-3 
from the Moon for energy production on Earth. 
One observation regarding the Chinese lunar mission concerns the technology used. Mapping 
missions require satellites with a high stabilization factor because they need to point at certain 
areas on a celestial body in the very same angle. This means that a satellite can hardly rotate in 
space or change its angle towards the body it is observing. In case a change occurs the data 
material collected would need to be re-evaluated because it is important to know which angle 
was used on which picture in order to evaluate that information material correctly. However, 
stabilization of a satellite in such a precise degree is very difficult. China’s lunar orbiter has 
proven that China already has learned to stabilize its satellites to such a degree (Zi 2007: 6). 
Another aspect that was more difficult than anything encountered by China so far was the 
challenge to design the orbit and to program both Chang’e and its corresponding carrier rocket 
to be captured by the lunar orbit. Although this was the first time a Chinese spacecraft had left 
the gravity field of Earth, it did so with a high precision and instead of three in-flight course 
corrections only two were necessary (Yang & Zhou: 2007). 
While US space analysts often add a touch of secrecy to China’s space program, this mission 
cooperated with ESA. It was the first time that an ESA ground-station, Maspalomas in Spain, 
transmitted signals to a Chinese satellite (ESA 2007b). This shows that while cooperation and 
information flows with some countries might be restricted this seems to be based on political 
reasons more than anything else. 
Regarding future missions that are in the making, China is working on Chang’e-II at the 
moment as Chang’e-I concluded its mission with an impact on the Moon’s surface on 1st of 
March. The chief designer of the Chang’e project Ye Peijian (叶培建) stated that Chang’e-II 
will be launched at latest in 2011. It is supposed to have a CCD resolution of about ten meters 
which is an improvement of twelve times in comparison with Chang’e-I (Ding 2009). The 
stated goals of Chang’e-II include further tests and research for the proposed soft landing of 
Chang’e-III. This information was released on the 3rd of March with the conclusion of the 
execution phase of Chang’e-I (SpaceDaily, 3rd March 2009). At a later point the chief designer 
of Chang’e, Ye Peijian, confirmed this statement (SpaceDaily, 12th March 2009). 
 
Motivation 
 
While many other parts of China’s space program either have very practical reasons like its 
telecommunication network or its satellite navigation system, there might be a few 
explanations needed for China’s lunar exploration program. It seems that lunar exploration has 
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been done in the sixties by the US and the former Soviet Union. Finally the US has won that 
race and managed to put humans on the Moon. Now the questions arises why there is a 
renewed need to return where we have already been. Luan Enjie, chief engineer of the Chinese 
lunar exploration program, would answer with a rhetorical question: “Just because other 
countries have mastered to produce cars, does that mean that we (China) don’t need to learn 
how to produce them?” (Luan 2007) 
One reason why it is politically important to explore the Moon is the international competition 
that is happening at the moment. According to industry experts the US current exploration 
initiative is not by chance trying to utilize the Moon as a stepping stone in order to reach Mars. 
There is a new space race that is happening and once again the players are of–perceived–
different ideological backgrounds. The capitalist league sends its most prominent 
representative, the US. The Communist league, although a meanwhile unfitting name, features 
China. Thus this is another project that should be seen in the light of ideological competition, 
as outlined in chapter 2.  
Similar to Shenzhou the second political component is the international prestige that China 
wants. Lunar exploration is another high-tech endeavor that only well developed countries in 
good financial shape can achieve. It should also be added that the Japanese had send a Moon 
probe only a month before the Chinese did and even India engaged in Moon exploration. 
Supposing the Chinese government is trying to assume a leadership role in South East Asia, 
there might not only be a scientific imperative that asks them to have a Lunar exploration 
program but a more rational imperative that is based on the Chinese power politics game in 
South East Asia.  
 
Assessment 
 
Following the details of the current capacity the question arises again on how all this links to 
China’s development plans. The answer in this case is simple. Chang’e contributes directly to 
Chinese development plans as they call for lunar exploration. Chang’e in its capacity has been 
the first successful mission that proved that the Chinese space program is capable of exploring 
the Moon. Furthermore, it collected data necessary for further missions. At the same time, it 
sent another strong message to other countries regarding the technological capacity of China. It 
proved that it is capable of achieving sending a man-made satellite to the Moon. Only a few 
other nations have achieved this so far. 
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China currently has the capability to fligh unmanned missions to the Moon. It does not yet 
have the capacity for sample return missions although research is underway. It has been stated 
officially that the current Chinese lunar exploration program’s final step calls for a lunar 
sample return mission (Ouyang 2004: 355).    
It needs to be emphasized that the Chinese organizational and technological capability has 
reached a level that allowed the Chinese National Space Agency to achieve an immediate 
success in its mission. Another crucial point in comparison with early US and Soviet Moon 
missions is their rocket’s high reliability. The Changzheng 3A rocket that delivered Chang’e-I 
into orbit has a very high success record. 
Running a Moon mission requires that China has the capacity to execute very precise trajectory 
and orbit calculations e.g. Chang’e only did two instead of three pre-planned in-flight course 
correction maneuvers. In addition to that China has put in place a proper telemetry, tracking 
and control (TTC) network, partially via its own TTC stations in China, partially through its 
Yuanwang TTC ships as well as through cooperations with other countries and institutions that 
own or run TTC stations such as ESA.  
China’s capability to develop and execute this mission proves a proficient organizational and 
technological level that the CNSA has achieved. Furthermore, there have been a few 
technological milestones that have been achieved with this mission both in reliability on 
materials used as the Chang’e lunar orbiter spent about a year and a third in space while its 
materials had to withstand the Moon shadow for a few times. Furthermore orbital insertion, the 
accuracy needed for surveying the Moon’s surface and so on. All these findings suggest that 
China has increased its overall capacity strongly in those last years.  
 
6.3.7 Capacity assessment 
 
Now that the six key aspects have been worked out it is time to review what China has in stock 
in order to understand what they can do and what they are not able to do yet. Similar to human 
beings, strength is a very relative concept. How capable a space program is, is often defined by 
comparing it with others. Essential areas thus contain a short comparison to systems from other 
countries in order to get a better understanding of global implications. 
What I want to show first is what China already has shown that it can do which ranges from 
existing infrastructure on Earth to key satellites. Spaceports are those places where missions 
start, and China has three of them that they can use for different mission profiles. Compared 
with other nations it is doing well in numbers but what China does not have yet is a spaceport 
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very close to the equator, which would help to lower mission costs substantially. However, 
China is building a spaceport on the island of Hainan at the moment.  
A system that China developed in its early beginnings of its manned space program is that of 
TTC ships: Yuanwang (远望). These ships enable China to fly missions without any other 
ground station than those on Chinese soil (Harvey 2004). In the early days before China 
became diplomatically active in leasing other ground stations these ships proved to be very 
useful and they are still deployed in order to increase communication time with every manned 
mission.  
Over those last decades China has also proven that it has very capable launchers. Chinese 
rockets do have very good success records. Although the Changzheng system did have issues 
in the past, there is no information available, neither Chinese nor independent intelligence, that 
these issues have come up again. Recent deals with international companies also show that 
China’s launches are internationally competitive in their prices. China has delivered many 
launches in the past but ITAR restrictions hinder many companies in launching their payload 
with China. 
The last technologically interesting feature that the Chinese manned space program harbors is 
its capsule that supports up to three people. That is the technological limit of the current design 
of Shenzhou’s orbiting module. China progressed quickly to this point, essentially adding one 
taikonaut every mission since Shenzhou-5. Furthermore, it has already learned the difficult 
technique of space walks which means that it has managed to pressurize and de-pressurize a 
booth that is separated from the main space in the orbiting module. Although there have 
already been many astronauts doing space walks, mainly in the construction of the 
international space station, this is one of the difficult technological barriers that every new 
country joining the manned space club encounters and needs to master as a preparation for 
future endeavors.  
Another stepping stone technology that China has demonstrated recently is sending probes to 
the Moon. Chang’e-I has been a success in terms of flight trajectory and subsequent Moon 
orbit-capture but the mission also brought forth good scientific results. The mission also 
proved that China’s communication technology is already good enough to enable these 
missions as course correction signals still went from Earth to Chang’e. Back on Earth the 
difficulty was in tuning the receiver dishes in a way that they could handle the relatively low-
energy signals from the Moon.  
Returning to the field of space applications for terrestrial needs, China built up reasonable 
capacity in this area too. By now China has three remote sensing satellites, class Yaogan, 
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which have SAR-sensors that enable penetration of clouds and work at night time. Three other 
Yaogan class remote sensing satellites in sun synchronous orbits have been deployed for 
further remote sensing purposes. Additionally to that there is an extensive weather observation 
system that China has deployed: Fengyun, meaning wind and clouds. This system has been 
improved to offer high-quality services for the Olympic Games in 2008. Especially in this area 
there are extensive upgrades planned. 
The last system that shall be mentioned here is China’s regional satellite navigation system 
Beidou-I. Its intelligent architecture saved costs and increased its deployment speed. Although 
only offering inferior accuracy to GPS it has a built-in communication capacity for end to end 
communication between system users. While already fully operational it has been used in the 
aftermath of the 2008 earthquake in Sichuan. Beidou-I was only the prototype so to say for 
Beidou-II, which will be a global satellite navigation system, a Chinese version of GPS. As of 
May 2009 Beidou-II is in its early roll-out phase. Only a few satellites have been launched but 
their signal signature structure has been confirmed to interfere with the European-led Galileo 
system. 
Despite all the knowledge that China has already build up, there are still a few gaps that have 
not been closed as of May 2009. One critical gap is that China has not developed a rocket that 
is capable of delivering the planned space station into orbit yet. Research of this rocket is 
underway but there have not been any successful tests that the author is aware of. This rocket 
not only is supposed to deliver parts of the Chinese space station into orbit but it is also 
intended for future missions to the Moon. While these missions are part of China’s plan for 
long term exploration, enabling technologies have not been tested in a real environment yet. So 
this is an essential technology that is still not developed at the moment. The fact that it is part 
of the MLP makes it more important to deal with. Comparing this with the technology of the 
US shows that although the US has already been to the Moon, it currently does not have the 
technology to return there but is doing so with its Ares program. Thus at the moment both 
China and the US are developing technology to go to the Moon, but none of them has the 
technology to send humans there.  
Another strategic asset that China might be interested in is the capability of deploying remote 
sensing satellites that are capable of real-time observation of the Earth. This capacity allows 
other countries to monitor strategically crucial events i.e. a North Korean rocket launch in real-
time and react accordingly. It is unclear whether China has the knowledge to build these 
satellites but can not do so because of a lack of launchers or whether both are lacking. A 
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development in this area should be anticipated but due to its dual-use nature no evidence has 
been found that it is actually happening. 
The most critical lack from a strategic point of view is the lack of a Chinese-controlled global 
satellite navigation system. This means that civilian applications and military forces are left at 
the good-will of the US military controlled GPS system. Although China does have a fully 
functional regional satellite navigation system, it does not offer the same accuracy as GPS does. 
China is working on closing this gap with the beginning of the roll-out of Beidou-II though. 
Last but not least China has not mastered the technology of rendezvous maneuvers in space yet. 
This means that China at the moment could send parts of its space station into space, if it had 
the necessary launcher, but it could not build it together due to a lack of this critical technology. 
It is also needed to dock Shenzhou spacecraft with the space station in order to exchange crew 
members, once the space station is built. Advanced space-faring nations like the US and Russia 
both have mastered this type of technology as they need it in every mission to the international 
space station. 
Taking into account China’s late start into its space program and how far it advanced, their 
progress is good. In some key areas like manned space exploration China has clearly shown 
that it is capable of developing and deploying world-class technology. Although China did not 
develop all the necessary technology by itself, it managed to procure whatever it decided to or 
could not produce on its own. However, a few key projects remain unfinished. They might be 
considered prestigious but still remain useless until they finished. 
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7. Conclusion 
 
The data found suggests that China’s space program is aligned with its development plans. 
China’s overall plan to improve its scientific capability and to increase its self-sufficiency 
offers a beneficial framework for their space program. This way the space program not only 
fulfills its primary goals but it strengthens China’s scientific backbone and proves China’s 
capability to execute high-tech projects independently. What is even more interesting though, 
are the other parts of the program that are hardly mentioned. First I shall conclude on my 
findings regarding the relationship of China’s development plans and what is being developed 
in the frame of the space program. After that other systems and the program’s overall 
tendencies and implications are described.  
Two current Chinese development plans, both the 11th Five-Year Plan and the Mid- and Long-
Term Plan for Scientific and Technological Development cover some of China’s space projects. 
The development of China’s Earth observation system and its manned spaceflight program–
Shenzhou–is in accordance with their development plans. Furthermore the development of an 
extensive lunar exploration program, with Chang’e-II and Chang’e-III already being in design 
and research stage respectively, is covered by the MLP. The same applies to the new 
Changzheng-5 rocket that China develops.  
What merits contemplation at this point are the reasons why all these projects are in the 
Chinese space project portfolio. The development of an Earth observation system clearly has 
its benefits for an array of terrestrial applications. The deployment of Yaogan satellites–a type 
of Chinese remote sensing satellites–helps China both to have an overview on China’s and the 
world’s crop growth as well as on military movements, at all times. Furthermore, in a country 
with the size of China it seems to be useful to install a high-end weather prediction system–
Fengyun. The expansion of such a system indicates a substantial interest in knowing and 
predicting the weather around the world and not only in China.  
Although the start of China’s spaceflight program was clearly for military purposes only, as 
many documents indicate, its successor Shenzhou–the Chinese name for their manned 
spaceflight program–is a political program with different intentions. In a competition between 
China and Western countries it serves as a proof that China with its different system and 
ideology is capable of developing and deploying a manned spacecraft. Additionally, it also 
serves as a lighthouse to the Chinese people. It shows how much the Chinese people can 
achieve. This way, it has more than one function: it improves the self-esteem of the Chinese 
people, it sends strong signals to the rest of the world that China has joined a technology-elite 
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club and is now its third member in history and that China is capable of achieving a 
technological masterpiece that only strong and important countries like the US and the former 
Soviet Union/Russia have achieved so far. 
Why does China want to explore the Moon? Apart from the fact that there is a Chinese legend 
by the name of Chang’e that talks of a beautiful woman on Earth’s companion, again there are 
worldly interests that render it valuable for the Chinese to go to the Moon. First of all there is 
the prestige involved in such a high-profile science mission. International prestige is a 
powerful tool when one is interested in increasing one’s activities within the international 
community and to influence its members. Additionally, there was the competition with Japan 
that had started its Selene mission shortly before China launched Chang’e. 
While many essential space projects are covered in the current Chinese development plans, 
there is one that is not: Beidou, also known as Compass. It is the Chinese satellite navigation 
system. In its original version–Beidou-I–it is a regional satellite navigation system with a smart 
architecture that helped to save costs but proved disadvantageous in some other aspects. 
However, now China is in the process of rolling out Beidou-II and it does so with considerable 
speed, at least considerably faster than the Europeans. Beidou-II will be global, not regional. It 
will have all the advantages of a modern global navigation satellite system thus allowing China 
to act independently of the US. Although many Chinese sources claim that it is a civilian 
system, there is no evidence that suggests superior accuracy to the US military-controlled GPS. 
This means that private consumers will hardly be inclined to switch to Beidou end-units. So the 
only big client left is the military. This is similar to the development of other satellite 
navigation systems in other countries i.e. the US, Russia and its proposed development in 
Europe. Further support for this argument can be found in Chinese literature that has pointed 
out the importance of satellite navigation systems in recent wars led by the US. Beidou 
satisfies China’s desire to be independent and at the same time contributes to the PLAs 
modernization. 
These findings suggest two key tendencies: growth and persistence. This pattern is similar to 
China’s economic development. Systems that existed before have either been updated or re-
designed. While some launches or deployments have been postponed due to technical reasons, 
no essential projects have been cancelled altogether. China’s serious political commitment to 
space development might be seen as one of the main differences with other space programs 
around the world where political commitment waxes and wanes depending on the government. 
In some programs political will succeeds financial resources by far, thus visions have to remain 
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visions. In other programs a lack of political will or political cohesion hinders the progress of 
essential programs. China has both of these essential assets. 
Although some projects seem to be motivated by prestige, they still have other functions that 
are beneficial to the Chinese leadership or to China. China’s key projects progress constantly 
and although there are some time delays, schedule and delivery normally do not show too big a 
gap. The Beidou system proves that funding always exists for important projects. The roll-out 
speed and determination offers a glimpse on what China wants: a fully-deployed global 
navigation system. 
Topics that are of interest for further research, as they might have severe international 
implications, are China’s military capacity in space and the Global Exploration Strategy. An 
anti-satellite test in January 2007 proved that China had mastered the technology to destroy 
one of their satellites with a kinetic kill vehicle i.e. crashing it with a rocket. This led to 
exceeding difficulties for satellite operators around the world. Space is a very delicate resource 
because once particles float in space, they actually become a hazard for other objects that move 
around the Earth i.e. satellites and manned spacecraft. The Chinese shoot down of a satellite in 
2007 and the US response, namely another shoot down of a US satellite in 2008, have triggered 
new discussions and initiatives on the topic of space traffic management. Preventing a 
junkyard in space does require new forms of cooperation and stronger mechanisms of 
enforcement. At the same time these incidents will also shape how future wars might be fought 
and thus research on its implications might be useful. 
The recently created Global Exploration Strategy could lead to improved results and a higher 
return of investment for space exploration. A rising China in the realm of space exploration 
indicates that there are more cooperation opportunities. Space exploration by its nature being 
expensive, further cooperation might help to share costs and mutually benefit from scientific 
findings. China is already one of the countries that participate in the Global Exploration 
Strategy but also China’s plan to build a space station on its own does offer certain cooperation 
opportunities that should be correlated with other space agency’s development plans. 
The implications of this thesis are a few but with a high relevance. The Chinese decision to 
build an indigenous satellite navigation system will improve increased action radius for their 
own military in the coming years until it will finally allow them to act globally, at least from a 
communication and navigation point of view. Another implication is that Beidou creates 
distress for the European Galileo endeavor. Without China being a potential market for using 
Galileo and paying for its services, the model will hardly work financially. Even more, the 
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overlay of certain Beidou frequencies with those of the publicly regulated service of Galileo 
ensures further issues between the European Union and China.  
The last implication is that China has demonstrated that it can live up to scientific world 
standards and can achieve ambitious goals with state of the art technology. Although China 
might not have developed everything by itself, this should rather be interpreted as economical 
maturity. To negotiate reasonable agreements with Russia was most likely cheaper than to 
develop and build everything on their own. This means that China might not have the required 
knowledge in all areas yet but it is fast in acquiring and in learning. Space is a strategic area. It 
is very difficult to get access to certain components or to be allowed to buy them but China still 
managed to do so. Wherever this did not work, it developed the other parts on its own. Given 
the strategic importance of space and the difficulty of developing and maintaining a well-
functioning space program similar analogies can be made for other technological and scientific 
key areas. 
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Acronyms 
 
CAST Chinese Academy of Space Technology 
CBERS China Brasilian Earth Resources Satellite 
CCD Charge Coupled Device 
CCP Chinese Communist Party 
CNSA Chinese National Space Agency 
CZ Changzheng, 长征 (Long March rocket) 
DF Dongfeng, 东风 (East Wind rocket) 
DoD Department of Defense 
ESA European Space Agency 
EVA Extravehicular Activities 
FAS Federation of American Scientists 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GEO Geosynchronous Orbit 
GNSS Global Navigation Satellite System 
GPS Global Positioning System 
GTO GEO Transfer Orbit 
ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile 
ISRO Indian Space Research Organization 
ISS International Space Station 
ITAR International Traffic in Arms Regulations 
ITU International Telecommunication Union 
JAXA Japanese Aerospace Exploration Agency 
LEO Low Earth Orbit 
LTO Lunar transfer orbit 
MEO Medium Earth Orbit 
MIT Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
PLA People’s Liberation Army 
PLAN People’s Liberation Army Navy 
PRC People’s Republic of China 
R&D  Research and Development 
SAR Synthetic Aperture Radar 
SBIRS Space Based Infrared Satellite 
SEZ Special Economic Zone 
SIGINT Signals Intelligence 
SSO Sun Synchronous Orbit 
TT&C Telemetry, Command and Tracking 
UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
UCS Union of Concerned Scientists 
UDMH ?? 
UN United Nations 
US United States (of America) 
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
WTO World Trade Organization 
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